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Class Action Settlements in Louisiana
Kent A. Lambert*
INTRODUCTION
The class action has enjoyed an enormous upsurge in the last decade, a trend
that both the state and federal courts in Louisiana have witnessed first hand.' The
spoils of victory in high-stakes class action suits continue to make attorneys
millionaires tens and even hundreds of times over, and there is little reason to
expect a quick end to the romance.'
An inevitable focal point for any practitioner swept up in this enthusiastic wave
is the nebulous practice of class action settlements. As numerous critics have had
recent occasion to observe, settlements have become such an integral part of
modem class action litigation that they often appear to provide both the motive and
the tactical engine driving high-profile class action suits.
As a general matter, settlements are a favored means for the resolution of legal
disputes.' This has been as true in the context of class action litigation as in the
context of traditional non-class litigation. Class action settlements offer obvious
benefits to litigants and courts alike by providing a valuable mechanism for
disposing of massive lawsuits that threaten to usurp huge amounts of resources and
time. At the same time, such settlements afford the members of plaintiffs' classes
with certainty in their recovery, while simultaneously providing class action
defendants with the benefits of res judicata extended across an entire class of
potential claimants.4 Increasingly, however, critics are claiming that many class
action suits are meritless inventions of over-aggressive plaintiffs' counsel, pursued
solely for their potential to extort favorable settlements through the risk that even
de minimus individual damage claims will be multiplied at the class level into
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1. See generally Geoffrey P. Miller, Class Actions in the Gulf States: Empirical Analysis of a
Cultural Sterotype, 74 Tul. L. Rev. 1682 (2000) (documenting a dramatic increase in the number of
class action lawsuits filed in Louisiana state and federal courts).
2. Several Louisiana attomeys have exploded into national prominence thanks to the tobacco
mass tort litigation, reaping pecuniary gains on a heretofore unimaginable scale. Jack Wardlaw, Law
Firms to Split $575 Million Fee, Feb. 1,2000, the Times-Picayune, A- 1. Indeed, the Washington Times
recently quoted one New Orleans litigator as complaining that "a $1 billion fee is 'not really all that
big."' Frank J. Murray, Big Tobacco Case Means Big Bucks to Attorneys: Even $1 Billion is Fee to
Blow Smoke At, Mar. 19, 1999, Washington Times, Al.
3. Williams v. First Nat'l Bank, 216 U.S. 582, 585, 30 S. Ct. 441,443 (1910); Fisher Bros. v.
Phelps Dodge Indus., Inc., 604 F. Supp. 446,449 (E.D. Pa. 1985); see also Florida Trailer & Equip. Co.
v. Deal, 284 F.2d 567, 571 (5th Cir. 1960) ("the policy of the law [is] generally to encourage
settlements").
4. See, e.g., Plummerv. Chemical Bank, 668 F.2d 654, 660 (2d Cir. 1982).
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massive sums of money that can empty even the deepest corporate pockets.5 These
critics argue that, at the very least, the high agency cost of class action litigation is
too often magnified by non-adversarial settlements.'
Perceptions of opportunistic, if not outright collusive, settlements by class
counsel have recently led to charges that most class settlements, policed by an
overburdened judiciary with little incentive to oppose them, 7 are choreographed by
the class attorneys to line their own pockets with huge sums of money garnered at
the direct expense of the class members whom they are supposed to be serving.
These and similar criticisms have gained an audience among the courts" and legal
5. A striking example of this appears in recent media coverage of the blossoming HMO
litigation, which has repeatedly commcnted upon attempts by so-called "mega-firms" to manipulate and
exploit Wall Street reaction to large class actions bought by powerful "conglomerations" of weli-healed
plaintiffs' attorneys to force settlements out of companies that investors fear may be unable to weather
protracted litigation. See, e.g., David Segal, Tag-Team Lawyers Make Businesses Blink: HMOs Latest
to Grapple With Threat of Investor-Scaring Mega- Verdicts, Washington Post, Nov. 12,1999, at AO1;
see also Allisa J. Rubin & Henry Weinstein, HMOs Hit With Class-Action Suits, Austin American-
Statesman, Nov. 24, 1999 at A-I. And corporate fears of debilitating litigation are not without some
legitimacy. Annual price tags well into the tens-of-millions of dollars for defending against aggressive
class action litigation are not unheard of, and such suits can drag on for years, even decades. Mark
Herrmann, From Saccharin to Breast Implants: Mass Torts, Then and Now, 26 Litig. 50, 52 (1999).
6. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey& GeoffreyP. Miller, The Plaintifrs Attorney's Role in Class
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 1, 12-27 (1991); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of EntrepreneurialLitigation: Balancing
Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 877, 883-89 (1987).
7. In Orleans Parish, the Civil District Court has seen on average more than 20,000 suits per
year over the last decade with an upward trend. Even one large class action suit, such as the recent Dow
silicone implant litigation, can forestall justice to literally thousands of litigants in these over-burdened
state trial courts, as well as consume an inordinate amount of appellate court resources. See, e.g., Dawn
M. Barrios, The Long and Winding Roadfor Spitzfaden, Louisiana s Breast Implant Class Action: Ad
Astra per Aspera, 74 Tul. L. Rev. 1941 (2000) (detailing the tortuous history of the Dow Coming
Corporation breast implant case, which, after years of burdensome pe-trial activities, numerous
appellate proceedings, and a six-month trial, ended with the decertification of the class).
8. See, e.g., Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996) (decertifying
nation-wide tobacco class action); In re American Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996)
(decertifyingplaintiffs' class in penile-implant suit); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1292(7th
Cir. 1995) (decertifying class in hemophiliac/HIV "mass tort" litigation).
Nor are these criticisms without some striking real-world examples, as illustrated by the result in
Hoffman v. Bank of Boston Corp., No. 91-1880 (Ala. Cir. Ct., Jan 24, 1994). In Hoffman, a group of
industrious class action specialists engineered a suit against Bank of Boston for allegedly requiring
excessive escrow deposits from its mortgagors. See Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506,
508 (7th Cir. 1996). In their suit, class counsel purported to sue for recovery of the lost interest and the
return of the escrowed principal itself. In a settlement drafted by class counsel--after rejecting a prior
settlement proposed by the Bank, which offered to refund all surplus escrow and pay an additional
$500,000 to class counsel-the Bank was to make a one-time interest payment on the escrowed funds
and return all surplus escrowed principal, with class counsel receiving fees out of this "fund" equal to
one-third of the total economic benefit to class members. See id. at 1063. The "brilliance" of this
proposal by class counsel, pursuant to which the bulk of the "consideration" to the class consisted of
the "return" of their escrowed principal, was the surrender of one-third of the principal to class counsel
in exchange for interest payments "ranging from $0.00 to $8.76." Kamilewicz, 92 F.3d at 508. The
net result to individual class members was a loss of upwards of $100 each. Id. The total fee to class
counsel for managing to lose money for the class members-between $8.5 to $14 million. Id.
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scholars9 around the country-not to mention within the national media."0 As a
result of the increasing resonance of such criticisms within the legal community and
the public in general, practitioners and courts must be prepared to deal with the
fallout, both in terms of mastering evolving procedural requirements and in terms
of overcoming (or exploiting) increasing hostility to many heretofore "common"
class action settlement techniques.
The recent adoption in Louisiana of a new procedural scheme for class actions,
based upon Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, presents a unique
opportunity to take a fresh look at this crucial facet of class action practice within
the state. However, even at the federal level, a recent succession of landmark
Supreme Court decisions has drastically altered the procedural landscape within
which class action settlements must be crafted.
This article provides a practical introduction to some of the most important
procedural issues surrounding the settlement of class action lawsuits, both under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the new articles governing class actions in
Louisiana's state courts. Part I of this article surveys the basic mechanics of class
action settlement procedures. Part II discusses how these procedures have been and
could be applied to safeguard against abuses of the class action mechanism.
I. THE NUTS AND BOLTS OF SETTLEMENT PRACTICE UNDER
THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. An-Introduction to Rule 23(e)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) provides that "[a] class action shall not
be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice.., to
all members of the class in such manner as the court directs."" Thus, "class
9. See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amcem
Products, Inc., 80 Cornell L. Rev. 1045 (1995); Barry F. McNeil & Beth L. Fancsali, Mass Torts and
Class Actions: Facing Increased Scrutiny, 167 F.R.D. 483 (1996); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding
the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law
Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 669 (1986). Indeed, these leading
commentators have been joined by the likes of Samuel Issacharoff, Larry Tribe, and John Leubsdorf in
criticizing liberalization of the rules governing class action settlements.
10. E.g., Joseph Nocera, FatalLitigation,Fortune, Oct. 16,1995,at 60,62; Joseph Nocera, Fatal
Litigation II: Dow Corning Succumbs, Fortune, Oct. 30, 1995, at 137; Neil A. Lewis, First Thing We
Do, Let's Pay All the Lawyers, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1997, at AS; Chris Woodyard, Big Settlements
Mean Banner Year for Lawyers, USA Today, Aug. 29, 1997, at 1-8; Michael Grinfeld, Fat City: Diet
Drugs, Once Fat for Masses Becomes Mass Tort, California Lawyer 47, 48 (Aug. 1998). Indeed, as
reported by Donald Massey et al. in a recent law review article, the Louisiana bench and bar have been
the object of particularly harsh criticism of late from the national press. Donald C. Massey et al.,
Curtailing the Tidal Surge: Current Reforms in Louisiana Class Action Law, 44 Loy. L. Rev:7, 50-51
nn.302, 305 (1998). Of course, there is some irony here, since it is also the tabloid-driven news media
that are responsible for launching many of the mega-actions they then criticize.
11. The requirements of Rule 23(e) represent a specific exception to the general rule that
voluntary dismissals do not require court approval. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(aXl) ("Subject to the
provisions of Rule 23(e)... an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court .. ");
2000]
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actions" cannot be compromised without first obtaining court approval and
affording proper notice (and an opportunity to be heard) to absent class members. 2
Clearly, Rule 23(e) paints with a broad brush. It leaves to the courts the task
of working out the practical details. Building on Rule 23(e), the Federal Judicial
Center's current Manual for Complex Litigation-a commonly-cited resource for
federal courts handling class action suits--suggests a two-stage process. First, the
proposed settlement should be submitted to the court for preliminary approval.
Second, an order is entered providing for notice of a formal "fairness hearing,"
during which the court will make a final determination as to whether the settlement
is fair, reasonable, and adequate. 3
This approach has been parsed by the courts into five distinct steps: (1) the
preparation and submission of a joint stipulation of settlement by class and defense
counsel; (2) a preliminary hearing at which the court makes an initial determination
as to whether to require notice of the settlement to class members and hold an
evidentiary hearing with respect to the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the
proposed settlement; (3) the issuance of notice to all class members, as directed by
the court, disclosing the terms of settlement, the options available to class members,
and the date, time, and location of the evidentiary hearing; (4) an evidentiary
hearing, at which time the parties, objectors, and any intervenors are required to
present arguments and evidence bearing upon the fairness, adequacy, and
reasonableness of the proposed settlement; and (5) the issuance of a fimal judgment
approving or disapproving of the proposed settlement. 4
B. The Settlement Agreement
The formal settlement process begins with the confection of a joint stipulation
of settlement for submission to the court. At a minimum, the stipulation must set
forth the essential terms of the proposed settlement, including "the amount of
settlement, form ofpayment, manner of determining the effective date of settlement,
see also National Hairdressers' & Cosmetologists Ass'n, Inc. v. Philadelphia Co., 4 F.R.D. 106 (D. Del.
1944) (holding that a local rule providing for automatic dismissal of an action for non-prosecution was
preempted by the requirement of court approval and notice in case of class actions). But see Papilsky
v. Bemdt,.466 F.2d 251,257 n.6 (2d Cir. 1972) (dismissal for lack of prosecution did not trigger Rule
23(e) because it was "involuntary").
12. So-called "peripheral compromises," or "side settlements" between class action defendants
and absent class members, however, ordinarily do not require court approval absent a clear indication
of fraud against the class or the court. As the First Circuit recently.explained, because such separate
merits compromises do not purport to settle the class action, Rule 23(e) is not directly implicated;
moreover, the systemic concerns with protecting absent class members through judicial scrutiny of
proposed class settlements are simply not present when absent class members obtain a settlement on
their own behalf with separate counsel. Duhaime v. John Handcock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 183 F.3d 1 (1 st
Cir. 1999); see also In re General Motors Corp., 594 F.2d 1106 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870,
100 S. Ct. 146 (1979); In re Shell Oil Refinery, 152 F.R.D. 526 (E.D. La. 1989).
13. See Manual for Complex Litigation § 30.41, at 236-37 (3d ed. 1995).
14. In cases where a class-wide settlement is reached before a class is certified, this process is
modified. The settlement process in such cases is discussed below in Part (E)(I)(d).
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and any recapture clause."' 5 As will be seen, counsel must be cognizant of myriad
factors in approaching the confection of a potential class action settlement. These
factors will have a direct impact upon the interests of their clients and the prospects
of court approval. They include: (1) the timing of the settlement (e.g., pre- or post-
certification); (2) the parties to the settlement, particularly the settling class
(including such issues as the impact upon future unrealized claims, the types of
claims to be covered, and the like); (3) the consideration being offered (e.g., is any
of the consideration non-pecuniary, as in the case of "coupon settlements,"
"reverter-fund settlements," and "monitoring settlements,"); (4) whether all or any
portion of the settlement consideration will be borne by insurers; (5) the risk of
adverse publicity (or the potential for favorable publicity) for the client;' 6 and (6)
the extra-jurisdictional impact of the proposed settlement on other like-actions.'
Ordinarily, the settlement will also provide for the payment of administration costs,
including notice expenses, distribution and claim/opt-out processing expenses, and
the like. Typically, these costs are either borne directly by the defendant or are
deducted from the settlement fund.' 8
This is also the appropriate occasion for class counsel to address the question
of attorneys' fees in cases involving a common fund settlement. Usually this can
be accomplished through the submission of a petition for the allowance of fees and
expenses to be paid out of the flund, although a stipulation by class counsel that total
fees will be limited to a certain percentage may also be an appropriate alternative
in some situations. 9 The concern here is to ensure that absent class members are
provided with enough information to allow them to calculate, or at least fairly
estimate, their net recoveries in connection with their evaluation of the proposed
settlement."0
15. Ordinarily, the stipulation would address all of the following: (1) the timing of distribution;
(2) the release between defendants and the class (and, if appropriate, between the various defendants);
(3) the payment of notice costs; (4) opt-out and proof of claim procedures including "blow" provisions
applicable where there are excessive opt-outs; (5) attorneys' fees; (6) confidentiality provisions; (7)
choice of law and choice of forum clauses; (8) "no-admission" clauses; (9) contribution and indemnity
provisions; (10) administration of the settlement funds; and (11) provisions concerning drafting and
execution of any ancillary pleadings or documentation. In so-called "public interest settlements," such
as a civil rights class action settlement, careful attention must also be given to defining the affected
class and the practice sought to be remedied. See Herbert B. Newberg & Alba Conte Newberg on Class
Actions § 11.24, at 11-34 (3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter Newberg] (citing Stanley Levy, Class Action
Settlement Techniques & Procedures, 19 Practical Law No. 8, at 69, 75 (Dec. 1975)).
16. See, e.g., Editorial Laptop Illogic, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 3,1999, atA26 (suggesting that
Toshiba entered into $2.1 billion dollar settlement merely to protect consumer good will).
17. See, e.g., Matsushita Elect. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 374, 116 S. Ct. 873, 878
(1996).
18. See also In re Penn Cent. Sec. litig., 560 F.2d 1138,1145 (3d Cir. 1977).
19. Concerns raised by the practice of class counsel negotiating for a fixed fee award with the
class action defendants at the same time the overall settlement is being negotiated are addressed
separately below in Part I(EXIXa).
20. A related issue too often overlooked by parties in crafting settlement agreements is the
disposition of unclaimed or unused settlement proceeds. A negotiated solution to this issue can
sometimes be used to smooth other feathers ruffled at points in the settlement dialogue. See infra notes
192-197 and accompanying text.
20001
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Ultimately, however, the stipulation should be tailored to its purpose, which is
to enable the court to make an informed "preliminary" determination as to the
"fairness" of the proposed settlement. To that end, common practice is to
supplement the stipulation with formal memoranda and supporting affidavits. These
documents can flesh out the background for the proposed settlement, including a
summary of the suit's subject matter and procedural history, a discussion of the
substantive merits of the case and any significant procedural hurdles, and an
explanation of why the proposed settlement is appropriate and fair with respect to
the interests of the absent class members.
C. The Preliminary Hearing
There is no express requirement under the Federal Rules for a preliminary
hearing to evaluate a proposed settlement, or even for preliminary approval of the
proposed settlement; final court approval of a proposed settlement is required,
however. Thus, some form ofpreliminary review of the proposed settlement makes
sense. A preliminary review can ensure that the expense of notice, as well as the
investment of time and resources by litigants and courts alike in connection with the
formal fairness hearing, are not wasted on a settlement that is outside the range of
anything the court might be prepared to approve.2
The Man ualfor Complex Litigation recommends that courts ordinarily conduct
a formal hearing at this stage. This hearing affords an opportunity for the court to
ensure that it is well informed about the context out of which the proposed
settlement arose, including the circumstances surrounding the parties' negotiations.
Further, the hearing provides a forum for the parties' counsel to explain the
settlement (as well as for anyone excluded from the material negotiations to be
heard).22 Notice of this preliminary hearing need not be provided to absent class
members, which minimizes the burden on the participating parties.' Thus, an
informal conference may be all that is required if the court already is familiar with
the particular lawsuit. Indeed, it may even be sufficient in the odd case for the
parties simply to submit the matter to the court on briefs.' Nevertheless, some sort
21. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 1979-1 Trade Cases (CCH) 62,690, at
77,880 (S.D. Tex. 1979). Preliminary review proceedings also provide a convenient forum for counsel
and the court to visit concerns raised by "competing" suits in other jurisdictions to their ability to close
on a settlement. In the federal courts, the possibility of obtaining injunctive relief to stay competing
state court proceedings under the "in aid ofjurisdiction exception" to the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2283, can be breached with the court at this time. See generally, e.g., White v. National Football
League, 41 F.3d 402, 409 (8th Cir. 1994). Similarly, removal of a competing state court class action
in the same venue as a settling federal class action may al..o be possible under the All Writs Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1651.
22. See Manual for Complex Litigation § 30.41, at 237.
23. Mungin v. Florida E. Coast Ry. Co., 318 F. Supp. 720,733 (M.D. Fla. 1970), aff'd, 441 F.2d"
728 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 897, 92 S. Ct. 203 (1971).
24. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145,170 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 1004, 108 S. Ct. 695 (1988); see also Manual for Complex Litigation § 30.41, at 236.
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ofpreliminary determination by the court as to the settlement's chances is advisable
25in nearly every case.
According to the Manualfor Complex Litigation, preliminary approval should
be granted by the court so long as the court's "preliminary evaluation of the
proposed settlement does not disclose grounds to doubt its fairness or other obvious
deficiencies, such as unduly preferential treatment of class representatives or of
segments of the class, or excessive compensation for attorneys, and appears to fall
within the range of possible approval .... 26 In short, the question is "whether
there is 'probable cause' to notify the class of the proposed settlement." '27 This
inquiry allows the court an opportunity to raise any concerns it may have with
respect to the proposed settlement. A court may condition preliminary approval
upon such terms as it deems appropriate, or even require that further steps be taken
as a prerequisite to the fairness hearing itself.
2
D. Notice of the Settlement
Assuming the court determines that preliminary approval of the proposed
settlement is warranted, the court should direct that notice of the proposed
settlement be given to the class members, including appropriate notice of a formal
fairness hearing. 29 Rule 23(e) flatly prohibits the settlement of a class action
without notice to all class members, and non-compliance with this requirement
necessitates that the offending settlement be overturned.-' Because a class action
settlement will bind absent class members who, by definition, are individuals that
are not before the court, notice under Rule 23(e) has significant due process
ramifications.' However, Rule 23(e) requires only that notice be given "in such
manner as the court directs," leaving the court with much discretion with respect to
the contents and manner of transmittal of the required notice. 2
25. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Board of Sch. Dirs., 616 F.2d 305,314 n.13 (7th Cir. 1980).
26. See Manual for Complex Litigation § 30.41, at 237.
27. Horton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 855 F. Supp 825, 827 (E.D.N.C.
1994).
28. E.g., Fisher Bros. v. Phelps Dodge Indus., 1985-1 Trade Cases (CCH) 66,536, at 65,670
(E.D. Pa. 1984); see generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(6), 23(d)(5); In re LaMarre, 494 F.2d 753 (6th Cir.
1974); see also Local Rule 9.4 for the Eastern District of Louisiana.
29. See Manual for Complex Litigation § 30.41, at 237.
30. Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655,663-64 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 917,102 S. Ct.
1773 (1982); see also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2249
(1997) (Rule 23(e) protects absent class members from "fainthearted" or selfish representatives);
Glidden v. Chromalloy Am. Corp., 808 F.2d 621,626-27 (7th Cir. 1986) (Rule 23(e) was designed to
frustrate attempts by class representatives to settle the case on terms favorable to them but at the
expense of absent class members).
31. E.g., In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 607 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 452 U.S.
905, 101 S. Ct. 3029 (1981); see also Sanders v. Robinson Humphrey/American Express, Inc., [1990
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,315 (N.D. Ga. May 23, 1990); Kincade v. General Tire
& Rubber Co., 635 F.2d 501, 507-08 (5th Cir. 1991).
32. SeeWeinbergerv. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61,70-71 (2dCir. 1982), cert. denied,464 U.S. 818,
104 S. Ct. 77 (1983); Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 770 F. Supp. 1499, 1501 (N.D. Ala. 1991),
20o0]
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The manner in which notice must be given is ordinarily the same as is required
for other types of class action notices. Individualized notice, ordinarily provided
by mail, only needs to be provided to those individuals who can be identified
through reasonable means." In securities litigation, beneficial holders are probably
not entitled to notice of settlement, even though notice to beneficial holders of the
pendency of class action litigation is required.3" Options available in situations
Where individual notice by direct communication is not feasible or practicable
include publication of the notice in newspapers, magazines, periodicals," radio and
television announcements,36 posting announcements on community bulletin
boards,37 and the like.3
Just as is the case with manner of notice, there are no prescribed standards39
governing the content of a Rule 23(e) notice. Nonetheless, the jurisprudence does
aff'dper curtain, 974 F.2d 1279 (11 th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 906,113 S. Ct. 2999 (1993);
Quigley v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 74,77 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
33. Weinberger, 698 F.2d at 71; see also, e.g., In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 607 F.2d 167
(5th Cir. 1979); Whitford v. First Nationwide Bank, 147 F.R.D. 135 (W.D. Ky. 1992); Hill v. Art Rice
Realty Co., 66 F.R.D. 449 (N.D. Ala. 1974), affd, 511 F.2d 1400 (5th CiT. 1975).
34. Compare Lewis v. Anderson, 81 F.R.D. 436,441-42 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) with In re Franklin
Nat'l Bank Sec. Litig., 574 F.2d 662, 668-72 (2d Cir.), mod'd 599 F.2d 1109 (2d Cir. 1978).
35. E.g., White v. National Football League, 41 F.3d 402(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1137,
115 S. Ct. 2569 (1994); Walsh v. Great At]. & Pac. Tea Co., 726 F.2d 956 (3d Cir. 1983); Airlines
Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n, Local 550 v. American Airlines, Inc., 455 F.2d 101 (7th Cit. 1972);
In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 177 F.R.D. 216 (D.N.J. 1997); In re Shell Oil Refinery, 155 F.R.D. 552
(E.D. La. 1993); Handschu v. Special Serv. Div., 605 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 787 F.2d
828 (2d Cit. 1986); Luevano v. Campbell, 93 F.R.D. 68 (D.D.C. 1981).
36. See In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D.297,311 (N.D.Ga. 1993); Harris
v. Pensley, 634 F. Supp. 1042, 1047 (D. Pa. 1987); cf. Stanley v. Darlington Cty. Sch. Dist., 879 F.
Supp. 1341, 1372 (D.S.C. 1995), rev'd in part on other grounds, 84 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 1996).
37. Plummerv. Chemical Bank, 668 F.2d 654,657 (2d Cir. 1982); Shuford v. Alabama State Bd.
of Educ., 897 F. Supp. 1535, 1547 (N.D. Ala. 1995); Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 783 F. Supp. 286,289 (N.D.
Tex. 1991), aff'd, 983 F.2d 1061 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 906, 114 S. Ct. 287 (1993); Harris,
634 F. Supp. at 1048.
38. Silberv. Mabon, 18 F.3d 1449(9th Cir. 1994) (notice to brokers holding disputed securities
in street names); Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 647 F.2d 388, 391 (3d Cir. 1981) (announcement at
plant meeting); Meyer v. Citizens & So. Nat'l Bank, 677 F. Supp. 1196 (D. Ga. 1988) (notice to state
agencies provided by mail to state governors); In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 100
F.R.D. 718, 730 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (same).
39. Like any rule, this one does have its exceptions. For instance, the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995), expressly mandates the disclosure of
certain information settlement notices issued in private actions arising under the Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. § 77a (the "Securities Act") or the Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (the "Exchange
Act"), that were not pending as of December 22, 1995. Specifically, notices in covered cases must
discuss all of the following and provide a summary of the information on the notice's cover page
(together with any other information the court might deem necessary or appropriate): (1) the amount
of the settlement; (2) the potential recovery had the class prevailed on the merits; (3) the attorneys' fees
and costs sought by class counsel; (4) the identity of class counsel; and (5) the reasons for the proposed
settlement. The Act also expressly prohibits placing covered settlement agreements under seal, though
there is an allowance for the protection of certain portions of such agreements if necessary to protect
against direct and substantial harm which can include reputational injury to a settling party. Securities
Act, at § 21D(aX5); see also H.-S. Conf. Rep., H. Rep. No. 104-369, at 35 (1995); S. Rep. No. 104-98,
at 13 (1995).
40. See Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 70 (2d Cir. 1982); see also In re Corrugated
[Vol. 61
KENTA. LAMBERT
offer some general rules of thumb. First, the notice must provide basic information
about the nature of the lawsuit, the general terms of the proposed settlement, and the
options available to class members with respect to the proposed settlement. Second,
it must alert the absent members to the fact that detailed information can be
retrieved from the court record and that they have the right to appear and be heard
at the fairness hearing.4
Despite the lack of any mandatory form, notices are increasingly becoming
standardized in their style and content, and almost always contain at least the
following: (1) a heading containing the caption of the lawsuit, a description of
affected class, and the time, date, location, and purpose of the fairness hearing; (2)
a description of the litigation, including an explanation of the asserted claims and
any affirmative defenses, and a summary of the case's procedural history; (3) a
description of the proposed settlement; (4) a disclosure of any requested allowances
for attorneys' fees; and (5) an explanation of the procedures for filing objections to
the proposed settlement, for obtaining documents, and for making claims against the
settlement fund."2 On occasion, a settlement notice will actually include a copy of
the stipulation of settlement, 3 but ordinarily all that is necessary is a general
description of the settlement's essential terms." Counsel, struggling with the
dilemma of providing comprehensive disclosures in a summary form accessible to
unsophisticated laymen and (in many cases) destined for publication through one
or more news media, can obtain some level of comfort by ensuring that the notice
explains how potential class members can get more information, for example, by
instructing class members who want more information on how to make appropriate
inquiries with the clerk of court.0 Again, the sufficiency of the notice of settlement
will be evaluated in light of its ability to so inform class members of the settlement
that 'they can make a reasoned and informed decision as to whether they will
intervene or otherwise raise questions or concerns about the settlement with the
parties or the court, or even whether they will refuse to participate in the settlement
outright.'
Understandably, courts generally do not require that the settlement notice set
out what each claimant can expect to recover. In most cases it would be extremely
Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195, 223 (5th Cir. 1981).
41. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 759 (E.D.N.Y. 1984),
aff'd. 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004, 108 S. Ct. 695 (1988); Miller v.
Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1977). This information should be presented in
a neutral, non-biased manner, couched in language readily accessible to the layman. See, e.g., White
v. Alabama, 74 F.3d 1058 (11 th Cir. 1996); Heitv. Amrep Corp., 88 F.R.D. 130,136 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
42. See Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 158 F.R.D. 314 (E.D. Pa. 1993); see also Weinberger
v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 79 (2d Cir. 1982); Newberg, supra note 15, § 8.32, at 8-105. Cf. Securities
Act, at § 21 D(a)(5).
43. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y., June 11, 1984) (slip
opinion).
44. Handschu v. Specials Seres. Div., 787 F.2d 828, 833 (2d Cir. 1986).
45. Often, courts will provide a special procedure through which class members can obtain and
review copies of the record. This procedure is designed to avoid unnecessary impositions upon the
court and clerk staff.
46. See Reynolds v. National Football League, 584 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1978).
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difficult, if not impossible, to do so.4 On the other hand, the notice should
generally apprise class members of the method in which their share of the total
settlement proceeds is to be determined. It is usually appropriate as well to alert
absent class members to the fact that legal fees and expenses will be sought by class
counsel and, if appropriate, that these costs are to be deducted from the total
recovery available for distribution to the class members. Finally, the notice should
disclose when and how approval of those fees will be requested, state whether the
fees are to be paid out of a settlement fund or be borne separately by the defendants,
and note that the court will review and approve the requested fees.4
As is normally the case, if a procedure for making claims against the settlement
fund (or for opting out) has been proposed, then it should also be included in the
notice.49 Similarly, most notices set forth a mandatory procedure by which
objections to the settlement must be submitted for consideration by the court.
Imposing such procedures is really a practical necessity, but they can be enforced
only to the extent class members have notice of them. Included in both the proof
of claim and objection descriptions should be a clear indication of when, where, and
how the objection must be submitted, as well as what it should contain.'
Finally, mention should also be made of items that courts have concluded do
not need to be included in a Rule 23(e) notice. Prominent among these unnecessary
items is information concerning the existence of objectors to the settlement5' and
disclosure of the possibility that class members themselves may be exposed to
potential future liability."2
E. Final Approval and the Fairness Hearing
Final court approval of a class action settlement is mandatory under Rule
23(e).53 Although commentators have argued in favor of amending Rule 23(e) to
iterate specific factors that courts should consider in evaluating a proposed
settlement,-' none are presently specified, leaving the analysis squarely within the
47. See, e.g., In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195,224 (5th Cir. 1982); In
re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 170 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004,
1085 S. Ct. 695 (1988).
48. See Newberg, supra note 15, § 8.32, at 8-107.
49. See Manual for Complex Litigation § 41.44, at 490-91.
50. The jurisprudence does not give any clear indication as to what constitutes an appropriate
delay period for claims or objections, although a 30 to 60 day period appears common. See Newburg,
supra note 15, § 8.37, at 8-118. Nonetheless, if the notice period is found to be too short, it may result
in the settlement being upset on due process grounds. Cf. Miller v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 559
F.2d 426, 429 (5th Cir. 1977).
51. See, e.g., In re Corrugated Containers, 643 F.2d at 224.
52. See also, Marshall v. Holiday Magic, Inc., 550 F.2d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir. 1977).
53. The Manual for Complex Litigation states that "[a]pproval is required of the settlement of
any action brought as a class action, regardless of whether the settlement occurs prior to certification,
and even if the only claims being settled are those of the individual plaintiffs, with the class claims
being dismissed without prejudice." Manual for Complex Litigation § 30.41, at 237.
54. See, e.g., William Schwarzer, Settlement of Mass Tort Class Actions: Order Out of Chaos,
80 Cornell L. Rev. 837 (1995).
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discretion of the trial court.s The exact mechanics of the fairness hearing are also
left to the court's discretion. 6 Indeed, a formal hearing need not be held at all
under certain circumstances, such as where there has already been extensive
discovery and pre-trial motion practice. 7 In other circumstances, however, a full
evidentiary hearing may be indispensable."
The proponents of the settlement bear the burden of demonstrating that it is
"fair, reasonable, and adequate." '59 Because the court's decision is discretionary, it
is reviewable only for abuse of discretion.' Nonetheless, the court must "apprise
itself of all facts necessary for an intelligent and objective opinion," and reach an
independent decision on the merits.6' The trial court ordinarily must provide written
reasons that include specific findings as to the "fairness, reasonableness, and
adequacy" of the proposed settlement and explain how the court reached those
findings.62
Significantly, however, the court is called upon to make the foregoing inquiries
without purporting to adjudicate the merits of the underlying claims, and without
presuming to rewrite the agreement negotiated between the parties. 3 By necessity,
this means that courts must give considerable weight to the views of counsel as to
the merits of a proposed settlement." Again, however, the court is charged with
conducting an independent analysis,65 and must be cognizant that counsel have
competing interests and obligations that may be at odds with full and unqualified
55. Miller v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1977); see also Van Horn v.
Trickey, 840 F.2d 604,606 (8th Cir. 1988); Newman v. Stein, 464 F.2d 689,692 (2d Cir.), cert denied,
409 U.S. 1039, 93 S. Ct. 521 (1972); Grish v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 156 n.7 (3d Cir. 1975).
56. See, e.g., Van Horn v. Trickey, 840 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1988) (no hearing required); Mars
Steel Corp. v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 834 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1987) (same).
57. See Malchman v. Davis, 706 F.2d 426,434 (2d Cir. 1983); Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d
61,79 (2d Cir. 1982); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 356 F. Supp. 1380, 1385 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd
in part, 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974).
58. Calhoun v. Cook, 487 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1973); see also Mandujano v. Basic Veg. Prods.,
Inc., 541 F.2d 832 (9th Cir. 1976).
59. Holmes v. Continental Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144. 1147 (11 th Cir. 1983); Whitford v. First
Nationwide Bank, 147 F.R.D. 135, 138-39 (W.D. Ky. 1992); In re Armored Car Antitrust Litig., 472
F. Supp 1357 (N.D. Ga. 1979), aff'd in pertinent part, 645 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1981); ef. Grinnell Corp.,
495 F.2d at 464; but see Airline Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n, Local 550 v. American Airlines, Inc.,
573 F.2d 960 (7th Cir), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876, 99 S. Ct. 214 (1978).
60. Maywaltv. Parker& Parsley Petr. Co.,67 F.3d 1072,1078 (2d Cir. 1995); DeBoerv. Mellon
Mortg. Co., 64 F.3d 1171, 1176-77 (8th Cir. 1995).
61. Weinberger, 698 F.2d at 74; see Malchman v. Davis, 706 F.2d 426,432-33 (2d Cir. 1983).
62. Malchman, 706 F.2d at433; Plumnerv. Chemical Bank, 668 F.2d 654, 659 (2d Cir. 1982);
In re Corrugated Container Antitrust UItig., 643 F.2d 195,218 (5th Cir. 1981); Kohn v. American Metal
Climax, Inc., 489 F.2d 262, 263 (3d Cir. 1973).
63. See, e.g., Malchman, 706 F.2d at 433; Reed v. General Motors Corp., 703 F.2d 170, 172
(5th Cir. 1983); Bryan v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 494 F.2d 799,804 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
900, 95 S. Ct. 184 (1974). In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297, 312 (N.D. Ga.
1993).
64. McDonald v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp., 565 F.2d 416, 426-27 (7th Cir. 1977); Grinnell
Corp., 495 F.2d 462; see also Manual for Complex Litigation § 30.43, at 241 ("Counsel for the parties
are the court's main source of information concerning the settlement.").
65. See, e.g., Hoffman Elec., Inc. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 800 F. Supp. 1289,1295-96 (W.D. Pa.
1992) (approving settlement over objections of class counsel).
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disclosures." Obviously, what comes out of this meat grinder is a highly
discretionary judgment call by the trial court-one that should not lightly be ungset
on appeal.
The Manual for Complex Litigation indicates that the courts' inquiry should
focus upon "whether the interests of the class as a whole are better served if the
litigation is resolved by the settlement rather than being pursued; 167 the
jurisprudence has re-articulated the same concept by asking whether the settlement
is fair, reasonable, and adequate from the perspective of the affected class
members."' The courts' inquiry should be guided by the principal, perceived
dangers posed by class action settlements, to wit: (1) infringement of the rights of
absent class members who may not have had a sufficient voice during the
settlement negotiations69 and (2) the possibility of collusion between the parties that
actually negotiated the settlement.7 Clearly, the inquiry is fact specific, and
"requires an amalgam of delicate balancing, gross approximations and rough
justice."7 '
Commentators interpreting the reported jurisprudence addressing court
approval of proposed class actions settlements have identified two general lines of
substantive inquiry. The first of these areas of inquiry calls for scrutiny of "the
negotiating process by which the settlement was reached,... demanding that the
compromise be the result of arm's-length negotiations and that plaintiff's counsel
possessed the experience and ability, and engaged in the discovery, necessary to
effective representation of the class's interests."72 The second line of inquiry
analyzes the objective or "substantive" fairness of the proposed settlement as
presented to the court, comparing "the terms of the compromise with the likely
rewards of litigation [to the class]."73
66. See Manual for Complex Litigation § 30.44, at 242 (while counsel owe a duty of candor to
the court, they "need also to take into account their ongoing obligations to their clients and the need to
protect their position should the settlement fail"); In re Oracle Sees. Litig., 829 F. Supp. 1176, 1179
(N.D. Cal 1993) ("an attractive attorney fee provision in the settlement agreement may induce class
counsel to settle regardless of the likelihood that further pursuit of the litigation might substantially
increase the total class recovery").
67. See Manual for Complex Litigation § 30.42, at 238.
68. See, e.g., Austin v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections, 876 F. Supp. 1437, 1456 (E.D. Pa.
1995); see also Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
953, 113 S. Ct. 408 (1992).
69. Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 688 F.2d 615,624 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1217, 103 S. Ct. 1219 (1983); White v. National Football League, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1416
(D. Minn. 1993); cf Saylor v. Lindsey, 456 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1972) (Courts must "exercise particular
care to see to it that non-asserting plaintiff has had a full opportunity to develop the basis for his
objection.").
70. See, e.g., Priddy v. Edelman, 883 F.2d 438, 447 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Weinberger v.
Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 73-74 (2d Cir. 1982); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the
Mass Tort Class Action, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1343, 1442 (1995).
71. City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 356 F. Supp. 1380, 1385 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), affd in part,
495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974).
72. Weinberger, 698 F.2d at 74.
73. Protective Comm. for Ind. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S.
414, 425, 88 S. Ct. 1157, 1163 (1968); see also Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 834 F.2d 677, 682 (7th Cir. 1987).
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1. Scrutiny of the Negotiation Process
As numerous courts and commentators have observed, there is an obvious
potential for collusion in class-action settlements between the defendants (who are
seeking to resolve liability with respect to the broadest possible class of putative
plaintiffs) and the class' counsel (who are interested in maximizing their own
attorney fees).74 These concerns are heightened in the context of mass tort class
action settlements involving exposure claims and like situations, where the potential
for resolving future claims may be a significant, or even the dominant driving force
behind a proposed settlement." As is explained later, scrutiny of the settlement
negotiation process in the mass tort class action context has given rise to two of the
U.S. Supreme Court's most significant recent decisions addressing class action
settlements.
Despite the acknowledged risk of collusion, the federal judiciary has articulated
a general rule that presumes the absence of fraud or collusion in the negotiation of
class action settlements. The rule is based solely upon a prima facie showing that
the settlement was the product of arms-length negotiations between experienced
counsel, trusting the objective review of the settlement terms themselves to expose
any harmful abuses by counsel. 6 In this way, the courts recognize that settlements
by their very nature represent the exercise of imperfect judgment by the negotiating
parties, who are attempting to evaluate and balance the potential of often
undeveloped legal and factual issues that may or may not ultimately be placed
before the court at trial. This jurisprudential approach has aptly been 6escribed as
the "proof is in the eating" standard, whereby courts are excused from second
guessing the judgment of counsel and the negotiating parties so long as the end
product appears fair and reasonable." In the words of the Fifth Circuit:
It is, ultimately, in the settlement terms that the class representatives'
judgment of the adequacy of their representation is either vindicated or
found wanting. If the terms themselves are fair, reasonable, and
adequate, . . . whether another team of negotiators might have
accomplished a better settlement is a matter equally comprised of
conjecture and irrelevance.7"
74. See e.g., Bowlingv. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141,152 (S.D. Ohio 1992); Coffee, supra note
6, at 883-89.
75. See Coffee, supra note 70, at 1442.
76. See, e.g., Priddyv. Edelman, 883 F.2d 438,447(6th Cir. 1989); Mars Steel, 834 F.2d at 681-
82; In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195, 212 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 998, 102 S. Ct. 2283 (1982); see also M. Berenson Co. v. Faneuil Hall Marketplace, Inc., 671 F.
Supp. 819, 823-24 (D. Mass. 1987); cf. Katz v. E.L.I. Computer Sys., Inc. [1970-71 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,994 at 90,676 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (there is a "strong initial presumption that
the compromise is fair and reasonable").
77. "Rather than attempt to proscribe the modalities of negotiation, the districtjudgepermissibly
focus[es] on the end result of the negotiation.... The proof of the pudding is indeed in the eating."
Mars Steel, 834 F.2d at 684.
78. In re Corrugated Container Antitrusi Litig., 643 F.2d at 212; see also, e.g., Bowling, 143
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a. Negotiating Class Counsel's Fees
Nonetheless, the foregoing provides a general rule only; there are situations
which present unique concerns requiring courts to scrutinize more closely the
negotiation process. Chief among these are cases involving the negotiation of class
counsel's fees as part of an overall settlement. Many courts (and commentators)
have perceived a risk that class counsel may be distracted from zealously guarding
the best interests of the class, and particularly the class' absent members, if the
question of their own legal fees becomes an essential element of a proposed
settlement.79 As one commentator explains:
The absence of a real client impairs the incentive of the lawyer for the
class to press the suit to a successful conclusion. His earnings from the
suit are determined by the legal fee he receives rather than by the size of
the judgment. No one [involved directly in the negotiations] has an
economic stake in the size of the judgment except the defendant, who has
an interest in minimizing it. The lawyer for the class will be tempted to
offer to settle with the defendant for a small judgment and a large legal
fee, and such an offer will be attractive to the defendant, provided the sum
of the two figures is less than the defendant's net expected loss from going
to trial.80
Certainly, it is common practice for defendants to challenge attorneys' fees
sought by a plaintiff. Especially in cases involving statutory fee provisions, such
challenges can have a noticeable impact upon the ultimate award approved by the
Court.81 This potential leverage can lead defendants to attempt to exact a more
favorable settlement in exchange for stipulating to a fee award (or even merely
agreeing not to contest fee applications below a ceiling figure).82 Unscrupulous
class counsel may be tempted to "sell out" the class to guarantee themselves a good
fee.
Even in the absence of obvious collusion, mixing negotiation of the overall
settlement with discussions of attorneys' fees can muddy the waters. 3 Particularly
in consumer and mass tort claims, where the class representatives are often
unsophisticated laymen, these concerns can at least lend themselves to an
appearance of impropriety." Offsetting these concerns, however, is the possibility
F.R.D. at 152-53.
79. See, e.g., Cisek v. National Surface Cleaning, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 110, 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(citing Malchrnan v. Davis, 761 F.2d 893, 904-05 (2d Cir. 1985)); see also Mendoza v. United States,
623 F.2d 1338, 1352-53 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912, 101 S. Ct. 1351 (1981).
.80. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 570 (4th ed. 1992).
81. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 70, at 1351.
82. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518, 524-25 (1st Cir. 1991).
83. Id.
84. See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768,
821 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 516 U.S. 824, 116 S. Ct. 88 (1995) (quoting In re "Agent Orange" Prod.
Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145,170-74 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 484 U.S. 1004,108 S. Ct. 289 (1987)).
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that defendants will be far less likely to settle cases where attorneys' fees are an
issue if that potential liability cannot be capped as part of the overall settlement.s5
Staking its claim at one extreme of the jurisprudential spectrum, the Third
Circuit in Prandini v. National Tea Co. 6 adopted a per se prohibition against the
simultaneous negotiation of attorneys' fees with the overall class settlement,
concluding that a flat prohibition is necessary to prevent an "attorney-class conflict"
over "one fund divided between the attorney and [an absent] client." 7 This per se
prohibition was subsequently overruled in Evans v. Jeff D. , at least as to cases
involving statutory fee claims. The Third Circuit, for one, continues to consider the
timing of fee negotiations to be relevant to the approval of a proposed class-action
settlement, and is inclined to enforce Prandini in cases where statutory fee awards
are not at issue. 9
In Evans, the Supreme Court expressed its marked reluctance to deprive class
counsel of the ability to include attorneys' fees and costs as an element of a
proposed settlement in actions that involve possible statutory fee awards (Evans was
a civil rights suit). It explained that potential exposure to fee awards can be of
crucial significance in such cases," given the difficulty of anticipating how a court
will exercise its discretion in fixing a fee award. The Court stated: "It is ... not
implausible to anticipate that parties to a significant number of civil rights cases will
refuse to settle if liability for attorney's fees remains open."
9
Echoing the Supreme Court's concerns, a Third Circuit Task Force, appointed
to address the issue of court-awarded attorney's fees, back-peddled from Prandini.
It recognizing that a per se ban even outside of statutory fee cases "may well tend
to discourage settlement... [by] mak[ing] it difficult for the defendant to ascertain
precisely what [that] liability will be, thereby eliminating the very certainty that
makes settlement attractive to the defendant." AThe Task Force recommended
various alternatives to a per se prohibition, including the following:
[T]he defendant should be permitted to make an offer of settlement that is
conditional on a subsequent satisfactory resolution of the question of fees.
This type of offer, assuming the fee in question is pursued in good faith,
85. One questionable resolution of these competing interests suggested in some comers is to
allow agreements wherein defendants agree not to contest fees up to a ceiling. See. e.g., Parker v.
Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 828,103 S. Ct. 63 (1982). By injecting the
court into the mix, this approach does mitigate some appearance problems, but it still raises the same
basic conflict of interest concerns that an outright fee agreement would.
86. 557 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. 1977).
87. Id. at 1021; see also CourtAwardedAttorneys'Fees, Report ofthe Third Circuit TaskForce,
108 F.R.D. 237- 266 (1985).
88. 475 U.S. 717,734-38, 106 S. Ct. 1531, 1540-43 (1986).
89. In re General Motors Trucks, 55 F.3d at 804; cf Ashley v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 794 F.2d
128 (3d Cir. 1986).
90. Significantly, the failure of the parties to address attorneys' fees in the settlement should not
per se bar their recovery. See El Club Del Barrio, Inc. v. United Community Corp., 735 F.2d 98, 100-
01 (3d Cir. 1984); see also Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 757-58, 100 S. Ct. 987 (1980); cf.
Wakefiled v. Matthews, 852 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1988); but see Aho v. Clark, 608 F.2d 365,367-68 (9th
Cir. 1979).
91. Evans, 475 U.S. at 735-37, 106 S. Ct. at 1541-43.
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usefully separates the issues of settlement of the merits and resolution of
the fees in a way that should minimize the defendant's reluctance to
negotiate.9 2
The Task Force added that, in some situations, a ban on simultaneous negotiations
could be abandoned altogether with appropriate disclosures and court supervision:
"The risk of liminal or even subliminal conflicts of interest arising seems to be
extremely low when the parties approach the court and request a waiver of Prandini
under the trial judge's supervision." 3
b. Non-Pecuniary Settlements
Similar concerns have been expressed with respect to so-called "non-
pecuniary" settlements. These settlements are seen in cases involving "coupon
settlements";9 securities litigation settlements involving the distribution of stocks,
puts, or warrants;9 as well as certain other non-traditional settlement arrangements,
such as those employing reverter finds,9e monitoring funds,"' and cy pres or fluid
fund distributions.9 It should be borne in mind that these approaches are not
92. 108 F.R.D. at 269.
93. Id.
94. In a coupon settlement-common in consumer class suits-discount, rebate, or other types
of manufacturer or vendor coupons are provided to class members as the settlement consideration. See,
e.g., In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir.
1995); General Motors v. Bloyed, 916 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. 1996). Typically, these agreements involve
the defendant assuming notice and administrative costs relating to the settlement, as well as the payment
of attorneys' fees based upon the parties' valuation of the coupons made available to class members.
95. In such non-cash securities settlements, the defendants contribute securities or put warrant
rights to class members as consideration for a class-wide release. In the most straight-forward example,
the class members receive stock in the defendant corporation out of a "stock fund" in proportion to their
alleged losses. See, e.g., In re TSO Financial Litigation, Civ. No. 87-7903, 1989.U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7434
(E.D. Pa. June 29, 1989). In a put-option settlement, the defendant offers to issue put-options to
members of the plaintiff shareholder's class whereby the corporation is bound to re-purchase the
holders' shares at the guaranteed floor price. See, e.g., Derdiarian v. Futterman Corp., 254 F. Supp. 617
(S.N.D.Y. 1966). Class members who have divested themselves of the defendant's stock would get
nothing under such an arrangement. In a warrant arrangement, the defendant agrees to sell stock to
class members at a strike price, usually set modestly above its then-current trading price. See, e.g.,
Seidman v. American Mobile Sys., 965 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Pa. 1997). This allows the defendant to
reduce any cash components of the settlement while allowing class members to share in any gains in
the value of the defendants' stock.
96. In reverter fund settlements, the defendant contributes cash to an escrow account to be paid
out to class members who apply for funds pursuant to a pre-set claims process, with any unclaimed
funds reverting to the defendant at the end of the set period. See, e.g., Boeing v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S.
472, 100 S. Ct. 745 (1980).
97. In monitoring fund settlements, money is set aside and earmarked to identify and pay future
damages incurred by class members. See, e.g., Woodward v. Nor-Am Chem. Co., Civ. No. 94-0780-
CBC, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7372 (S.D. Ala. May 23, 1996).
98. In cypres settlements, payments are made to claimants even though they have not established
damages, or even membership in the class, and can be utilized in consumer interest cases where class
membership is substantial and individual losses and recoveries minimal. See generally, Michael
Malina, Fluid Class Recovery as a Consumer Remedy in Antitrust Cases, 47 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 477
(1972).
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mutually exclusive, and are often utilized along with a monetary component as well.
The principal criticism of such arrangements is that parties to a non-adversarial
settlement can manipulate the valuations of such non-traditional considerations to
enhance the likelihood of approval and in this way increase attorneys' fees for class
counsel. The result is a direct expense to class members who, in a more traditional
monetary settlement, likely would have been able to demand greater total out-of-
pocket consideration from the defendant. The defendant often is concerned only
with the total actual settlement value and, hence, does not have a vested interest in
how the settlement proceeds are allocated between class members and class counsel.
Therefore, the defendant may be perfectly content to go along with an enhanced
valuation to close a deal, thereby improving the prospects of getting court approval
for the settlement, and making exaggerated fees obtained by class counsel look
more humble than they actually are relative to the true recovery ultimately realized
by the class.
Despite these quite legitimate reasons for concern, the use of alternative forms
of consideration can, in some instances, benefit class members. An example is seen
where the defendant and the class are able to split cost-savings that the defendant
realizes as the result of avoiding certain capital-generation/liquidation expenses or
even by enabling the defendant to avoid bankruptcy.
c. Reverse Auctions
The increasingly common situation of the simultaneous pendency of several
multi-jurisdiction class actions targeting the same defendant in separate
jurisdictions" should raise another red flag for courts examining proposed
settlements. A defendant in this situation can find itself, however unwittingly, in a
position that allows it to play class counsel in the competing actions against one-
another. By exploiting the threat that it may be able to retard the progress of those
actions with uncooperative class counsel,"° a defendant can force class counsel in
the competing suits to enter into a bidding war through early settlement discussions.
This ploy might force one to resolve their actions first, thereby assuring that they
will recover their fees."0 '
99. See Linda S. Mullenix, Dueling Class Actions, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 26, 1999, at BI8. The
problem is at its worse where multiple state court suits are involved, as federal transfer rules such as 28
U.S.C. § 1407, stay orders, and local consolidation provisions should limit the worst examples in federal-
practice. See. e.g., Blair v. EquiFax Check Services, Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 839 (7th Cir. 1944). Cf
Matsuchita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 116 S. Ct. 873 (1996) (recognizing that state
courts have the power to decide multi-jurisdictional class action lawsuits).
100. The possibility of obtaining federal injunctive relief enjoining further prosecution of other,
competing class-action lawsuits to protect a settlement adds yet another layer to this analysis. See supra
note 21.
101. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Overlapping Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 514 (1996). A
variation of this "reverse auction" process can arise where multiple attorneys are competing to get a
class action certified. Here, a defendant can shop settlement offers amongst the competing attorneys
in exchange for assisting the one with the best offer to obtain certification. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note
70, at 1370-73. Cf Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 126 F.3d 1235, 1249, 1250 (9th Cir. 1997); In re General
Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 814 (3d Cir. 1995).
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d. Pre-Certification Settlements
Pre-cerfification settlement discussions are yet another "red flag" for courts
scrutinizing proposed class settlements. Pre-certification settlements, effected
through the use of "settlement classes," have become a "stock device" for resolving
class-action litigation, and are recognized in every circuit.'0 2 Despite its wide-
spread acceptance, the settlement class device is not expressly recognized under
Rule 23, and has recently been the subject of some fairly harsh criticism by courts
and commentators who suggest that settlement classes are a veritable petri dish for
collusion.'0 3
Ironically, the Manual for Complex Litigation, which in its first version
disapproved of the practice of settlement classes altogether, has moved to a cautious
endorsement of the practice. Historically, in a pre-certification settlement, the
parties stipulate to the composition of a temporary settlement class with
"certification" of the settlement class "merged" into the court's approval of the
settlement itself and without any direct analysis of the requirements of Rules 23(a)
and 23(b).' 04
The practice of side-stepping certification in cases where a quick settlement
seems possible has come under increasing attack. In General Motors Corp. Pick
Up Truck Fuel Tank Products Liability Litigation, the Third Circuit held that before
a court may approve a proposed pre-certification class-action settlement, it must
first determine, upon a proper inquiry, that at least the requirements of Rule 23(a)
are satisfied.'0° According to the court, the threshold findings for class certification
under Rule 23(a) are required before a court can effectively safeguard against
collusion, buy-offs, and other potential abuses. It cannot adequately adjudicate the
proposed settlement's fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy with respect to absent
class members without such findings.'0" In the court's words, "'[A] class is a class
102. SeeAmchemv. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,618-19,117.S. Ct. 2231,2247 (1997);seealso, e.g.,
Gould v. Alleco, Inc., 883 F.2d 281 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1058, 110 S. Ct. 870 (1990);
In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 607 F.2d 167,175 n.5 (5th Cir. 1979) (collecting cases), cert. denied,
452 U.S. 905, 101 S. Ct. 3029 (1981); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 105 F.R.D. 475,478 n.2 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (collecting cases).
103. See, e.g., In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Prod. Liab. Utig., 55 F.3d 785 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 824, 116 S. Ct. 88 (1995); Judith Resnik, Litigating & Settling Class Actions:
The Prerequisites of Entry and Exit, 30 U.C. Davis L Rev. 835, 848 (1997).
104. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709,740 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959, 110 S.
'Ct. 3770 (1989); In re BeefIndus. Antitrust Litig., 607 F.2d 167,176 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 905, 101 S. Ct. 3029 (1981); see also In re Asbestos Litig., 90 F.3d 963, 975 (5th Cir. 1996)
(citing Newberg, supra note 15, § 11.28, at 11-58), vac ldsub nom. Flanagan v. Ahem, 521 U.S. 1114,
117 S. 6t. 2503 (1997); In re General Motors Corp., 55 F.3d at 798; Georgine v. Amchem Prods., 157
F.R.D. 246, 314-19 (E.D. Pa. 1994), vac"d, 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), aff'dsub nora. Amchem Prods.
v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997). Cf In re Dennis Greenman Secs. Litig., 622 F.
Supp. 1430, 1436 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (certifying mandatory limited-fund settlement class to force
settlement), rev'd, 829 F.2d 1539, 1546 (11 th Cir. 1987) (finding limited fund theory inappropriate
under facts of case).
105. In re General Motors Corp., 55 F.3d at 794-97. For a more in depth discussion of
certification requirements for a putative class action, see Kent A. Lambert, Certification of Class
Actions in Louisiana, 58 La. L. Rev. 1085 (1998).
106. In re General Motors Corp., 55 F.3d at 787.
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is a class,' and a settlement class, if it is to qualify under Rule 23, must meet all of
its requirements.' °7
A few years later, in Georgine v. Amchem Corp., 8 the Third Circuit went even
further by expressly requiring that settlement classes comply with the applicable
provision under Rule 23(b)'°--in that case, Rule 23(b)(3)-as well as the
requirements of Rule 23(a). The Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit's
decision, ruling that while "[s]ettlement is relevant to class certification," concerns
of collusion and like misconduct underlying Rule 23 "demand undiluted, even
heightened attention in the settlement context" to the requirements for certification
under Rules 23(a) and (b)."' The prior case law approving of a relaxed application
of certification requirements to settlement classes was thereby abrogated."' The
Court's only concession was to allow that "a district court need not inquire whether
the case, if tried, would present intractable management problems, for the proposal
is that there be no trial."" 2 The Supreme Court expressly rejected the argument that
Rule 23(e)'s fairness inquiry obviated the necessity for strict compliance with the
requirements of Rules 23(a) and 23(b).'" Writing in dissent, Justice Breyer argued
that the existence of a proposed settlement should play a much more significant
factor in the evaluation of a proposed settlement than allowed by the majority's
ruling."
14
Most recently, the Supreme Court in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,' 's rebuffing an
attempt by the Fifth Circuit to limit Amchem to class actions arising under Rule
23(b)(3), held that approval of a mandatory Rule 23(b)(1)(B) limited-fund
settlement class required the development of a record demonstrating that the
essential prerequisites for certification of a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class are satisfied.
This requires proof that the only available "fund" for satisfaction of class members'
claims is inadequate and that the "fund" can be equitably distributed to all class
members in a manner adequately addressing any potential intra-class conflicts. The
Supreme Court found that the record developed before the district court, in
107. Id. at 799-800.
108. 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996).
109. Cf. Lambert, supranote 105, at 1111.
110. Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,620, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2248 (1997). As Justice
Ginsburg explained:
The safeguards provided by the Rule 23(a) and (b) class-qualifying criteria... are not
impractical impediments-checks shorn of utility-in the settlement-class context. First,
the standards set for the protection of absent class members serve to inhibit appraisals of the
chancellor's foot variety-class certifications dependent upon the court's gestalt judgment
or overarching impression of the settlement's fairness.
Second, if a fairness inquiry under Rule 23(e) controlled certification, eclipsing Rule
23(a) and (b), and permitt[ed] class designation despite the impossibility of litigation, both
class counsel and court would be dis-armed....
Federal courts, in any case, lack authority to substitute for Rule 23's certification criteria
a standard never adopted-that if a settlement is "fair," then certification is proper.
Id. at 621-22, 117 S. Ct. at 2248-49.
111. Id. at 619-23, 117 S. Ct. at 2248-49.
112. Id. at 620, 117 S. Ct. at 2248 (citations omitted).
113. Id. at 622-28, 117 S. Ct. at 2249-51.
114. Id. at 629-30, 117 S. Ct. at 2252. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
115. 527 U.S. 815, 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999).
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connection with its approval of a $1.535 billion class action settlement, was
inadequate because the court had relied upon the parties' stipulation as to the
existence of a limited fund."6 Furthermore, it had failed to address potentially
conflicting interests of "easily identifiable categories of claimants" (particularly
future claimants)" 7 through provisional certification of subclasses under Rule
23(c)(4)(B). Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Stevens, wrote a lengthy dissent
echoing the concerns he had iterated in his dissent in Amchem.
The Supreme Court's focus on so-called "futures" claimants is an entr6 to one
of the most hotly debated issues surrounding pre-certification settlements.
"Futures" classes are classes consisting of individuals who may be harmed in the
future as the result of alleged past misconduct by a defendant, usually as the result
of their exposure to some harmful product (so-called "exposure-only" claimants). "'
Obviously, defendants who are faced with potentially substantial exposure to future
claimants, as in the case of many mass tort claims," 9 will view the ability to cap
their exposure to these claimants as a critical component of any large-scale class-
action settlement.
20
As noted above, the U.S. Supreme Court has made it clear that a proposed
settlement class must satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b). This raises one
of the most significant hurdles to futures class-action settlements: adequacy of
representation. Because future claimants by definition have not yet realized any
cognizable injuries, class representatives who have initiated litigationbecause they
have already been injured would ordinarily be inadequate representatives of the
future claimants.' 2' In addition, although perhaps to a lesser degree, the presence
of future claimants would appear to raise problems under the typicality requirement
of Rule 23(a) and, if applicable, the superiority and predominance requirements of
116. The court was troubled by the absence of proof establishing the upper limit of the posited
fund. This was especially glaring, since the fund consisted primarily of insurance proceeds, leaving in
tact nearly all of the named defendant's net worth. The court was also concerned by the apparent
exclusion from the settlement class, evidently pursuant to negotiations between the parties, of a
significant number of individuals with claims or foreseeable future causes of action based upon the
"common" theory of liability asserted against the defendant, an obvious anathema to a limited fund
settlement.
117. See infra notes 118-139.
118. See generally Georgine v. Amchem Prods., 83 F.3d 610,617-18 (3d Cir. 1996), affd sub
no Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
119. Pursuant to 1999 La. Acts No. 989, § I (eff. July 9, 1999), La. Civ. Code art. 2315 was
amended to prevent asymptomatic plaintiffs from recovery for medical monitoring or other exposure-
based "damages." Section two of the act confirms that the legislation specifically intended to overrule
Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Indus., 716 So. 2d 355, 361 (La. 1998). The statute provides for retroactive
application in all pending actions.
120. See generally Stephen C. Yeazell, The Past and Future ofDefendant and Settlement Classes
in Collective Litigation, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 687,700-02 (1997).
121. See Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626-27, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2251 (1997)
(explaining that claimant with existing injuries cannot adequately represent future claimants because
the former seeks to maximize immediate distributions, rather than secure largest possible protected fund
to pay future claims); Walker v. Liggett Group, 175 F.R.D. 226, 233 (S.D.W. Va. 1997); see also
Georgine, 83 F.3d at 630-31 (noting other potential conflicts between present and future class
members).
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Rule 23(b)(3). 2 2 With respect to typicality, the Third Circuit in Georgine-echoing
many of the same concerns it raised with respect to adequacy of
representation-concluded that:
Even if this case included only futures plaintiffs, we would be skeptical
that any representative could be deemed typical of the class. In addition
to the problems created by differences in medical monitoring costs, the
course of each plaintiffs future is completely uncertain. Given these
uncertainties, which will ultimately turn into vastly different outcomes, the
futures plaintiffs share too little in common to generate a typical
representative.'"
For essentially the same reason, the Third Circuit in Georgine felt that it would be
impossible to say that common issues of law and fact predominated when speaking
of future claimants because "[i]t is unclear whether they will contract asbestos-
related diseases and, if so, what disease each will suffer."'" One could, however,
criticize this post-facto analysis as overlooking the fact that, until the injury is
manifest, all future claimants do have a common interest in maximizing future
allowances and facing common legal and factual issues with respect to the
defendants' liability.
Even if these threshold certification dilemmas can be satisfactorily addressed,
as through the use of futures sub-classes represented by potential future claimants, "'
there are other problems posed by futures class settlements. For example, because
many (if not all) future claimants are likely unaware that they may suffer future
injuries as the result of some prior occurrence, such as exposure to a toxin, it is
unlikely that they can be relied upon to provide meaningful supervision of class
counsel. 26
Additionally, difficulties in estimating the volume of future claims and the
potential for collusion between the defendant and class counsel, at the expense of
as-yet-unidentified futures class members, presents an obvious risk that the futures
claims will not be resolved in a fair or adequate manner.2 7 This is true especially
in lump sum settlements or other arrangements capping a defendants' potential
liability to future claimants. Two constitutional issues are also posed by settlements
involving future claimants. The first is notice, which, as discussed above, has been
held to have crucial due process implications.12  Providing adequate notice, in
122. Georgine, 83 F.3d at 634-35.
123. Id. at 632.
124. Id. at 626.
125. So long as the harm complained of is common to the class, it should not be necessary to
demand that the representative must be a! risk to develop exactly the same injury as class members.
See, e.g., Hassine v. Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169, 177 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S.
488,494, 94 S. Ct. 669, 675 (1974). But see Coffee, supra note 70, at 1434-36.
126. See Coffee, supra note 70, at 1432.
127. Id. at 1361-63 nn.58-60.
128. See generally Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S. Ct.
652,657 (1950) ("An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which
is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
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accordance with Rule 23(e) to future claimants, presents an obvious problem.
Nonetheless, in In re "Agent Orange "Product Liability Litigation, "9 the court held
that published and broadcast notice was sufficient for "unknowing" class
members. 30 On appeal, the Second Circuit concluded that individual notice to
future claimants presently unaware of any injury was largely an exercise in futility,
and could be done away with in light of the more effective safeguards afforded by
"vigorous and faithful vicarious representation," as well as "fair and just recovery
procedures."''
This would remain the position of the federal jurisprudence for nearly a decade,
until the Third Circuit's decision in Georgine v. Amchem Products.3 After the
district court had specifically approved published notice to unidentifiable future
claimants, the Third Circuit reversed and remanded, holding: (1) that the district
court had improperly proceeded with a stipulated settlement without ensuring
compliance with Rules 23(e) and 23(b), and (2) that the proposed settlement class
failed to meet the requirements under those rules. Addressing itself specifically to
the "superiority" requirement under Rule 23(b)(3), the Third Circuit appeared to
suggest that notice problems posed by adequately informing future claimants of a
proposed class settlement barred approval of any settlement attempting to resolve
future claims absent individual notice. This approach is rarely, if ever, feasible in
mass tort cases, which are the most common context for futures class-action
settlement.' According to the Third Circuit, future claimants likely would be
unaware that they were at risk of future injuries. Even if they were aware and knew
that they were within a proposed settlement class, they likely would not have
enough information to make an intelligent decision as to whether or not to opt out
of the settlement. 34 Although the Supreme Court affirmned Georgine on appeal
without reaching the issue of notice, 3 it did "recognize the gravity of the question
whether class action notice sufficient under the Constitution and Rule 23 could ever
be given to legions so unselfconscious and amorphous."''"
The other constitutional issue of note concerns whether "future claims" rise to
the level of a "case" or "controversy" under Article III, Section 2 of the U.S.
Constitution. The salient question is whether prospective future claims are merely
"hypothetical," such that they fail to present an injury in fact susceptible of
adjudication. The Supreme Court has addressed this question only in the context
objections."); see also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176, 94 S. Ct. 2140, 2152 (1974).
129. 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied. 484 U.S.
1004, 108 S. Ct. 695 (1988).
130. Id. at 729-30.
131. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1435 (2d Cir. 1993); see also
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317,70 S. Ct. at 658-59 (holding that notice need not be given to persons "whose
interests are either conjecture or future"); Manual for Complex Litigation § 30.45, at 244.
132. 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), aff'd sub nom. Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 117
S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
133. Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 633,117 S. Ct. at 2254.
134. Id.
135. The Supreme Court decided and affirmed Georgine solely on the questions of adequacy of
representation and predominance. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 628, 117 S. Ct. at 2252.
136. Amchem, 521 U.S. at628,117S. Ct. at2252.
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of injunctive class actions, where its decisions support standing for future claimants.
However, there are significant differences between the formulation of the case or
controversy requirement in the context of injunctions and its formulation in the
context of damage cases.' The Supreme Court has thus far refused to address the
issue in cases involving damages class actions. '3 Lower courts that have addressed
the issue have reached different results through the application of diverging
interpretations of prior Supreme Court precedent.'39
Recent cases have identified several other issues applicable to practitioners
considering a pre-certification class action settlement. Among the most significant
of these concerns is the timing of the settlement discussions. Obviously, the
sooner the parties enter into serious settlement discussions, the less likely it is that
plaintiff's counsel are in a position to fully exploit the crucial leverage provided by
the threat of litigation during settlement negotiations."4 Nonetheless, this is a fact-
specific inquiry, as illustrated by the Fifth Circuit's decision in In re Asbestos
Litigation.'4' In that case, the court refused to deny approval of a proposed
settlement merely because it was filed on the same day as the class-action
complaint. Based upon what the court described as the lengthy and adversarial
history of the -underlying dispute and evidence showing that the settlement
137. See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 3-16, at 119-24 (2d ed. 1988)
(collecting cases). Indeed, the Supreme Court has stressed the need for an immediate threat of injury
that is neither "conjectural" nor "hypothetical," but has failed to give any clear gudance with respect
to where the line should be drawn. The Supreme Court has noted that "[p]ast exposure to illegal
conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy.., if unaccompanied by any continuing,
present adverse effects," but in the context of asbestos litigation, for example, the causal connection
between past exposure and a heightened risk of certain illnesses can be demonstrated, often through so-
called "inventory class members" who have already manifested such illnesses. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414
U.S. 488,495-96,94 S. Ct. 669,676-77 (1974). In the absence of clear criteria as to what amount, or
even what sort of proof is needed to move from the conjectural and hypothetical to the immediate,
courts are left to fend for themselves. Perhaps lessons can be drawn from the Supreme Court's recent
excursions into the "gatekeeping" functioning of federal courts in determinigthe admissibility of expert
testimony. See, e.g., Kumbo Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149-51, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1175-76
(1999).
138. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 612-13,117 S. Ct. at 2234-35. The Court has made it clear that
concerns relating to theArticle III standing ofputative class members should notbe addressed until after
class certification issues have been resolved:
Ordinarily, of course, this or any other Article Ill court must be sure of its own jurisdiction
before going to the merits. But the class certification issues are, as they were in Amchem,
'logically antecedent to [the existence of any] [sic] Article 111" concerns, and themselves
pertain to statutory standing, which may properly be treated before Article III standing.
Thus, the issues about Rule 23 certification should be treated first, "mindful that [the
Rule's] requirements must be interpreted in keeping with Article Ill constraints ..
Oritz v. Fireboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815,830, 119 S. Ct. 2295,2307 (1999) (quotingAmchem, 521 U.S.
at 612-13, 117 S. Ct. at 2234-35).
139. Compare In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1434 (2d Cir. 1993)
(suggesting exposure to know toxin may satisfy the imminent and real risk of injury requirement), and
Ashton v. Pierce, 541 F. Supp. 635, 637-38 (D.D.C. 1982) (exposure to lead paint held to confer
standing), with Robinson v. Vaughn, No. 91-7646,1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19518, at * 4 (E.D. Pa. Dec.
2, 1992) (exposure to asbestos held not sufficient to confer standing).
140. See generally In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995).
141. 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Flanagan v. Aheam, 521
U.S. 1114, 117 S. Ct. 2503 (1997), aff'd, 134 F.3d 668 (5th Cir. 1998).
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negotiations were genuine and conducted at ann's length, the coincidence of filing
of the lawsuit and the proposal of a settlement did not show that the settlement was
collusive. A slightly different situation-contributing to a contrary conclusion-is
articulated in the Third Circuit's decision in In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up
Truck Fuel Tank Products Liability Litigation. The General Motors court found
that the proposed settlement was reached within only four months of the inception
of the litigation, which strongly suggested that class counsel did not have a
sufficient grasp of the merits of their case "fairly, safely, and appropriately [to]
decide to settle the action."'42 The Third Circuit was particularly troubled by the
absence of any significant discovery by the class, notwithstanding their access to
discovery generated in related lawsuits. 43 According to the court, without indicia
that class counsel had the benefit of a clear understanding of the strength of their
case during negotiations, a court simply could not reasonably conclude that there
had been genuine, arm's-length negotiations.'" In other words, it was unclear that
they were fully in a position to bring to bear the leverage attendant to the threat of
litigating the class action. On the other side of the coin is the possibility that the
plaintiffs would ultimately fail in getting a class certified at all, in which case the
defendants would be in the much stronger position of taking on piecemeal those
claims brought by class members actually inclined to sue on their own behalf. In
the case of many consumer class suits, denial of certification can, quite literally, be
the death knell of the entire litigation.
2. Analysis of the Settlement Agreement
The other half of the "fairness" inquiry, required for final approval of a
proposed class-action settlement, requires that the court scrutinize the proposed
settlement itself. Distilled to its most essential elements, this line of analysis
requires that the court compare "the terms of the compromise with the likely
rewards of litigation."'' To do this, the court must reach "an intelligent and
objective opinion of the probabilities of ultimate success should the claim be
litigated," based upon "an educated estimate of the complexity, expense, and likely
duration of such litigation ... and all other factors relevant to a full and fair
assessment of the wisdom of the proposed compromise."'" The Supreme Court's
admonition for objectivity notwithstanding, this inquiry is inherently subjective and
fact-specific. For this reason, courts must guard against the temptation to turn an
appraisal of the potential success of a class-action lawsuit into a dress rehearsal of
142. 55 F.3d 768, 814 (3d Cir. 1995), affd, 134 F.3d 133 (3d Cir. 1998):
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S.
414, 424-25, 88 S. Ct. 1157, 1163 (1968). See also Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley Petr. Co., 67 F.3d
1072, 1079-80(2d Cir. 1995).
146. Anderson, 390 U.S. at 424,88 S. Ct. at 1163; see also In re Dow Coming Corp., 192 B.R.
415,421-22 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
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the very trial the litigants are attempting to avoid. 47 Moreover, the court must
guard against substituting its judgment for the informed judgment of the litigants. 48
In undertaking this difficult analysis, the federal courts have identified a myriad
of factors that, under the particular circumstances of a given case, may bear upon
the appropriateness of approving a proposed class-action settlement.'49 These
include: (1) "the complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation";' s (2)
the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement, including the number
of objectors;' (3) the "reasonableness" of the consideration offered to the class in
light of the best possible recovery if the case were litigated, with appropriate
allowances accounting for the risks of establishing liability and damages, and for
other potential contingencies during litigation; 5 2 (4) the defendant's ability to
withstand a judgment affording a greater recovery; (5) the possibility of whether
insurance proceeds have buttressed the consideration offered to the class and, if so,
whether there is a risk that litigating the class's claims could result in a denial of
recovery (and what effect this would have upon the defendant's ability to satisfy
an adverse judgment);1 ' (6) the practical merit of the proposed plan of
distribution;'. (7) the impact the settlement may have upon other rights or claims
of the class members against the defendants; 5 6 and (8) the views of class counsel.'57
147. Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 74 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub norm. Lewy v.
Weinberger, 464 U.S. 8 18, 104 S. Ct. 77 (1983); Behrens v. Wometco Enterps., Inc., 118 F.R.D. 534,
539 (S.D. Fla. 1988); Stull v. Baker, 410 F. Supp. 1326, 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Entin v. Barg, 412 F.
Supp. 508, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
148. See, e.g., Weinberg v. Lear Fan Corp., 627 F. Supp. 719, 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
149. See generally Girsch v. Jepsen, 521 F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1975) (citing City of Detroit v.
Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448,463 (2d Cir. 1974)); see also Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n
of San Francisco, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Byrd v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of
San Francisco, 459 U.S. 1217, 103 S. Ct. 1219 (1982).
150. Girsch, 521 F.2d at 157; Behrens v. Wometco Enterps., Inc., 118 F.R.D. 534,539 (S.D. Fla.
1988).
151. Marshall v. Holiday Magic, Inc. 550 F.2d 1173, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 1977); Pettway v.
American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1217 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115, 99 S.
Ct. 1020 (1979); Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d at 462; White v. National Football League, 822 F. Supp.
1389, 1425 (D. Minn. 1993), aft'd, 41 F.3d 402 (8th Cir. 1994); Burger v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 76 F.R.D.
183, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). But see In re Oracle Secs. Litig., 829 F. Supp. 1l76 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
152. DeBoer v. Mellon Mrtg. Co., 64 F.3d 1171, 1177 (8th Cir. 1995); In re General Motors Corp.
Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 806 (3d Cir. 1995); Van Horn v. Trickey,
840 F.2d 604,607 (8th Cir. 1988); Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d at 463; see also In re Domestic Air Transp.
Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297,325 (N.D. Ga. 1993); Thompson v. Midwest Found. Indep. Phys.
Assoc., 124 F.R.D: 154 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
153. Marshall, 550 F.2d at 1178; Girsch, 521 F.2d at 157; Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d at 467; In re
Warner Comms. Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735,741 (S.N.D.Y. 1985), aft'd, 798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986).
154. See, e.g., Spencer v. Comserve Corp., [1986-87 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
23,124 at 95,529 (D. Minn. 1986).
155. In re Clearly Canadian Sec. Litig., 966 F. Supp. 930, 937 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Ohio Publ.
Interest Campaign v. Fisher Foods, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 1, 11 (N.D. Ohio 1982).
156. See, e.g., ClassPlaintiffsv. City of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268,1285(9th Cir.), cert. denied,506
U.S. 953, 113 S. Ct. 408 (1992).
157. Pettwayv. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157,1216(5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1115,99 S. Ct. 1020 (1979); see also Fisher Bros v. Phelps Dodge Indus., Inc., 604 F. Supp.
446 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
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a. Judicial Risk Analysis
Without attempting a comprehensive survey of the jurisprudence applying the
foregoing (and other) criteria, a few key practice points do bear special mention.
First, most courts, as one would expect, devote the majority of their attention to
determining the size of the settlement viewed against the risks of litigation. It is
indeed the rare settlement that offers the plaintiff class everything it could
reasonably have expected to recover had the case gone its way at trial."5 8 As a
result, this inquiry tends to degenerate into scrutiny of the plaintiffs' chances of
prevailing, with the court attempting to look behind the business judgment of the
negotiating parties to test the soundness of the fruit of their efforts-all without
purporting to decide the merits. 9
The court obviously cannot be expected to engage in this risk-analysis with
mathematical precision any more than the parties could. In some cases, such as
shareholder suits, even basic cost-benefit analysis can quickly become mired in the
minutia of complex and often speculative lawsuits."W If the court perceives
significant risks against ultimate success, then a modest settlement offer may
appropriately be considered fair, reasonable, and adequate.16 As the focus on
substantive potential suggests, courts should not allow their analysis to be distracted
by discussions about the availability of treble or punitive damages or statutory fee
awards. 162
b. The Role of Class Counsel
Another salient factor must be the input received by the attorneys involved in
the litigation and settlement process. Indeed, many opinions explicitly concede that
"great weight" was afforded to the recommendations of participating counsel. 163
Nonetheless, the court must be cognizant of the fact that these attorneys may not
share the same agenda as the court.'" Aside from concerns about collusion and
158. See Marshall v. Holiday Magic Inc., 550 F.2d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir. 1977).
159. See, e.g., Inre "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145,170-74 (2dCir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1004, 108 S. Ct. 696 (1988); Anderson v. Torrington Co., 755 F. Supp. 834, 835-39
(D. bid. 1991); Behrens v. Womteco Enterps., Inc., 118 F.R.D. 534,542 (S.D. Fla. 1988); Fisher Bros.
v. Cambridge-Lee Indus., Inc., 630 F. Supp. 919 (E.D. Pa. 1985); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust
Litig., 1981-1 Trade Cases (CCH) 64,114 (S.D. Tex. June 4, 1981). aft'd, 659 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir.
1981); Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 72 F.R.D. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1976),aft'd,556F.2d 682 (2d
Cir. 1977).
160. See Newberg, supra note 15, § 11.44, at 11-99 n.242.
161. In re Traffic Exec. Ass'n Eastern RR, 627 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1980); City of Detroit v. Grinnell
Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 455 (2d Cir. 1974).
162. See, e.g., Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d at 458-59; In re Dennis Greenman Secs. Litig., 622 F.
Supp. 1430, 1441 (S.D. Fla. 1985); Fisher Bros., 604 F. Supp. at 451; cf In re Baldwin-United Corp.,
607 F: Supp. 1312, 1331 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
163. See, e.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1115, 99 S. Ct. 1020 (1979); Feder v. Harrington, 58 F.R.D. 171, 176 (S.D.N.Y.
1972); Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 55 F.R.D. 308, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
164. See, e.g., Morales v. Turman, 569 F. Supp. 332 (E.D. Tex. 1983); Percodani v. Riker-
Maxson Corp., 50 F.R.D. 473,478 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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fraud, courts should also consider such factors as the length of time the attorney has
been involved in the litigation as well as the competence and experience of the
attorney providing the recommendation to the court.165 Similarly, approval of the
settlement by an interested govemrnetal agency also warrants judicial attention.'"
c. Class Reaction
Finally, the courts also must consider the reaction (if any) of the class members
themselves to the proposed settlement. The absence or relative dearth of objectors
has long been recognized to provide significant support for a proposed settlement. 67
Those courts that have emphasized this element have usually noted overwhelming
affirmative support for the settlement among the absent class members, as might be
shown where members are prepared to walk away from individual suits to
participate in the settlement.'"
On the other hand, the absence of objections is not alone dispositive,"' and in
some coniexts may be of little moment.' Similarly, even a considerable number
of objectors is not, of itself, an adequate basis for a court to reject a proposed
settlement. 17 Courts must scrutinize objections carefully to determine whether they
raise legitimate concerns that do, in fact, call into doubt the fairness,
reasonableness, and/or adequacy of the proposed settlement, and then independently
determine whether those concerns, if legitimate, warrant disapproval of the
settlement. "2
165. Newberg, supra note 15, § 11.47, at 11-112; see Morales, 569 F. Supp. at 337-38.
166. See Marshall v. Holiday Magic Inc., 550 F.2d 1173,1178 (9thCir. 1977);see also Mendoza
v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912, 101 S. Ct. 1351 (1981).
167. See, e.g.,Marshall, 550 F.2d at 1 178; Sanders v. U.S. Dept. of Housing& Urban Dev., 872
F. Supp. 216 (E.D. Pa. 1994); In re Dunn & Bradstreet Credit Servs. Customer Litig., 130 F.R.D. 366
(S.D. Ohio 1990); Fisher Bros. v. Cambridge-Lee Indus., Inc., 630 F. Supp. 482 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
168. See, e.g.,CityofDetroitv. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d. 448, 462 (2d Cir. 1974); Sanders, 872
F. Supp. at 220-21; White v. National Football League, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1425 (D.Minn. 1993); In
re Art Materials Antitrust Litig., 100 F.R.D. 367,372 (N.D. Ohio 1983); cf. In re General Motors Corp.
Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106, 1137 (7th Cir.) ("Acquiescence to a bad deal is something
quite different than affirmative support."), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870, 100 S. Ct. 146 (1979).
169. See In reCorrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195,217-18(5th Cir. 1981); Cotton
v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1331 (5th Cir. 1977); see also In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 607 F.2d
167, 180 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905, 101 S. Ct. 3029 (1981).
170. See, e.g., In re General Motors Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768,812-
13 (3d Cir.) (absence of objections could not be construed as support for settlement. where class
members may have lacked adequate information to understand and evaluate offer), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 824, 116 S. Ct. 88 (1995); Buchett v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 684, 691 (D.
Minn.), op. amended, 858 F. Supp. 944 (D. Minn. 1994); In re Oracle Sees. Litig., 829 F. Supp. 1176,
1179 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (poverty of objectors was "of little moment, however, because agency costs often
discourage meaningful objection in securities class actions").
171. See, e.g., County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295,1325 (2d Cir. 1990);
see also Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 823 F.2d 20, 23 (2d Cir. 1987); In re Southern Ohio
Correctional Facility, 173 F.R.D. 205,214 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
172. See generally Newberg, supra note 15, § 11-48, at 11-118 through 119 (discussing Kincade
v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 635 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1981); Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204 (5th
Cir. 1982); and Ficalora v. Lockheed Co., 751 F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1985)); see also Pettway v. American
Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1217 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115, 99 S. Ct. 1020
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Note that any party to the proposed settlement has standing to object, including
any member of the settling class.'73 However, individuals that are not members of
the class, such as those who may have opted out, do not have standing to challenge
a proposed settlement,' 7' although they may obtain standing through intervention. "
Non-settling defendants also lack standing to object to a settlement,'76 except to the
extent that particular terms of a proposed settlement may unduly affect or prejudice
their rights' 77
Courts should not be too quick to pass over the concerns of objectors.
Objectors are entitled, as a general matter, to pursue reasonable discovery necessary
for them fully to evaluate and address a proposed settlement. 8 Nonetheless,
whether to permit additional discovery by objectors beyond what has already
occurred in the lawsuit is a matter fully within the court's discretion.'79 In deciding
whether to permit objectors to impose the burden and expense of responding to
additional discovery upon the settling parties, the court should carefully consider
whether it is truly necessary, by requiring the objectors to demonstrate that
sufficient information is not already available to them from other sources; including
the record itself.'8 To obtain additional discovery, the objectors already must have
reviewed the record'' and be able to demonstrate to the court why they need
additional information beyond what can be found there. ' This burden may be met,
for example, where the objectors can demonstrate that the class representatives did
not conduct appropriate adversarial discovery prior to the settlement.8 3
Courts are particularly reluctant to permit objectors to pursue discovery
concerning the settlement negotiations themselves. As a general rule, discovery
about the settlement negotiations is permitted only where the objectors provide
prima facie proof of collusion or fraud.'" Indeed, only one reported federal
(1979).
173. E.g., Gould v. Alleco, Inc., 883 F.2d 281 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1058, 110
S. Ct. 870 (1990); cf. Cook v. Powell Buick, Inc., 155 F.3d 758, 761 (5th Cir. 1998) (non-named class
members of a certified class do not have standing to appeal a final judgment approving the settlement
of a class action).
174. Gould, 883 F.2d at 285; In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 450 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
175. See Cook, 155 F.3d at 761-62; cf Luevano v. Campbell, 93 F.R.D. 68,77-78 (D.D.C. 1981).
176. Quad/Graphics, Inc. v. Fass, 724 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. 1983); In re Fire Paper Litig., 632 F.2d
1081 (3d Cir. 1980); see also In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 607 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 905, 101 S. Ct. 3029 (1981).
177. See, e.g., In re Granada Partnership Sees. Litig., 803 F. Supp. 1236 (S.D. Tex. 1992)
(allowing non-settling defendants to challenge term purporting to limit their inderrmification or
contribution rights); Altman v. Liberty Equities Corp., 54 F.R.D. 620,625 (S.N.D.Y. 1972); see also
Florida Power Corp. v. Granlund, 82 F.R.D. 690 (M.D. Fla. 1979).
178. See Girsch v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1975).
179. City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 464 (2d Cir 1974).
180. See, e.g., Bell At. Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1315 (3d Cit. 1993); Weinberger v.
Kendrick. 698 F.2d 61, 79 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818, 104 S. Ct. 77 (1983); Grinnell
Corp., 495 F.2d at 463.
181. See. e.g., Weinberger, 698 F.2d at 79.
182. Id.; see also Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d at 464.
183. See, e.g., Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 904 (2d Cir. 1972).
184. See, e.g., Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Illinois Nat. Bank& Trust Co., 834 F.2d 677, 684
(7th Cir. 1987) (discovery of setlment negotiations is "proper only where the party seeking it lays a
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appellate court decision could be located wherein the court actually found that
direct discovery into settlement negotiations was actually warranted.'s
F. Post-Judgment Issues
Once the court approves the settlement, the order is considered a final judgment
that may be appealed under 28 U.S.C. §1291."6 Standing to appeal that decision
ordinarily is vested in all class members who objected to the proposed
compromise.' However, at least one circuit has held that individual, un-named
class members must have actually intervened to have standing to appeal a final
judgment in a class action.' The Eleventh Circuit explained this result as follows:
There are essentially three reasons for holding that individual, non-named,
class members do not have standing to appeal a final judgment binding on
the class members. First, such individuals cannot represent the class
absent the procedures provided for in Rule 23 . . . . Second, class
members who disagree with the course of a class action have available
adequate procedures through which their individual interests can be
protected. Third, class actions could become unmanageable and non-
productive if each member could individually decide to appeal. 9
The Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, however, have reached the opposite
conclusion."9
There is also a split among the federal circuits as to whether the disapproval
of a monetary settlement is appealable as a final decision under §1291091 Of
course, a party may always seek to have a ruling disallowing a settlement certified
for immediate review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Rule 54(b).
The trial court ordinarily will retain jurisdiction to supervise and enforce
implementation of the settlement. Certainly, disputes requiring court intervention
can and do arise in the implementation phase. A common example is a dispute over
foundation by adducing from other sources evidence indicating that the settlement may be collusive")
(citing Thornton v. Syracuse Say. Bank, 961 F.2d 1042, 1046 (2d Cir. 1992)); White v. National
Football League, 822 F. Supp. 1389 (D. Minn. 1993), aff'd, 41 F.3d 402 (8th Cir. 1994); see also
Gautreaux v. Pierce, 690 F.2d 616,632 (7th Cir. 1982).
185. See In re General Motors Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106, 1126 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 870, 100 S. Ct. 145 (1979).
186. Cf. id.
187. See Research Corp. v. Asgrow Seed Co., 425 F.2d 1059, 1060-61 (7th Cir. 1970).
188. Guthrie v. Evans, 815 F.2d 626, 628 (1Ith Cir. 1987).
189. Id.; Shults v. Champion Int'l Corp., 35 F.3d 1056(6th Cir. 1994); see also Bowlingv. Pfizer,
Inc., No. 93-1912, 1993 WL 533489 (6th Cir. Dec. 21,1993) (non-named class members generallyhave
no standing to appeal final judgment in class action).
190. See Bell At]. Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1308 (3d CiT. 1993); Marshall v. Holiday
Magic, Inc., 550 F.2d 1173, 1176 (9th Cir. 1977); see also In re VMS Ltd. Partnership Secs. Litig., 976
F.2d 362, 368 (7th Cit. 1992) (non-named class member may appeal if she intervenes or makes an
appearance at fairness hearing).
191. Compare Norman v. McKee, 431 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1970) (appealable as collateral order),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912, 91 S. Ct. (1971), and In re International House of Pancakes Franchise Litig.,
487 F.2d 303 (8th Cir. 1973) (allowing appeal), with New York v. Diarylea Coop., Inc., 698 F.2d 567
(2d Cir. 1983) (refusing appeal) and Seigal v. Merrick, 590 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1978) (same).
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unclaimed or unused settlement proceeds, which in some cases can represent
sizeable sums ofmoney. " Ifnot addressed in the settlement agreement,'93 the court
is vested with substantial discretion to resolve disputes concerning the distribution
of excess funds.'94 Many courts confronted with such a situation have exercised
their discretion to direct a cy pres distribution of the funds to educational
institutions, charities, or other public service groups. 95 The court may also order
t at excess funds be returned to the defendant in appropriate cases.' A further
distribution to class members already fully compensated, however, seems
inappropriate, as it would merely result in a windfall to them.
. Another common dispute arising in the implementation phase is what to do
with late-filled proofs of claim in settlements providing for payments to class
members on a claims-made basis. Reported decisions addressing such situations
have articulated a fact-specific "good cause" analysis. 9 Such an approach seems
sound and appropriate.
Note should also be taken, however, of the common practice of delegating
administration of the settlement fund, including oversight of the processing of
proofs of claim and the distribution of cy pres allocations, to third party
professionals or special masters. 9" In cases where an administrator is used, the
matter ordinarily will remain open until a final accounting is filed into the record
showing that the settlement has been fully effectuated.' 99
192. See, e.g., West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer& Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (addressing
$32 million in unclaimed settlement proceeds).
•193. See supra note 20.
194. See, e.g., Jones v. National Distillers, 56 F. Supp. 2d 355, 357-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). It has
been suggested, however, that courts in fact do not have this discretion in all cases, because any
unclaimed funds deposited with the court should "escheat" to the government as unclaimed property.
Louisiana, which has adopted the Uniform Distribution of Unclaimed Property Act, La. R.S. 9:151
(2000), expressly provides for the escheat of "property received by a court as proceeds of a class action,
and not distributed to members of the class, one year after the distribution date." La. R.S. 9:159(a)(9)
(2000). It seems doubtful that this provision applies to settlement proceeds, particularly to excess funds
addressed in a settlement agreement. The federal courts have reached exactly this result under 28
U.S.C. §§ 2041-2042, which provide for the escheat of unclaimed funds deposited with federal courts.
See Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 739 F.2d 730, 735-36 (2d Cir. 1985); Jones, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 358.
These cases conclude that escheat is at most one of several options available to a court faced with
unclaimed funds, and is more appropriately seen merely as a fall-back position in cases where guidance
cannot be gleaned from cypres principles of the equitable interests of the parties themselves. See also
Six Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301 (5th Cir. 1990); Houck v. Folding
Carton Admin. Comm'n, 881 F.2d 494 (7th Cir. 1989); Van Gemert, 739 F.2d at 736.
195. See, e.g., Superior Beverage Co. v. Owens-llinois, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 477,478-79 (N.D. Ill.
1993); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., No. MDL 250,1991 WL 532867 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 1991),
aff'dmem., 934 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Powell v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 1!9 F.3d 703, 706-
07 (8th Cir. 1997).
196. See Friedman v. Landala Parking Auth., [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
98,676 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 1995); see also Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 488 n.4, 100 S.
* Ct. 745, 754 n.4 (1980).
197. See, e.g., Grace v. City of Detroit, 145 F.R.D. 413,414 (E.D. Mich. 1992).
198. See Barnes v. Osofsky, 254 F. Supp. 721,726 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
199. Newberg, supra note 15, § 11.33, at 11-68 through 11-69.
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G. Pivate Settlements
1. Attempting to Settle with Class Representatives Alone
A significant, though ancillary, facet of class action settlement practice
concerns attempts by the defendant to enter into private settlements, either with the
class representatives or with absent prospective class members. In the former
context, settlement is sought only with the named representatives, without
purporting to bind any absent class members. At first blush, Rule 23(e) might seem
superfluous in this setting, since settlement is not sought with the class. Hence,
prejudice to absent class members-a principal concern underlying Rule
23(e)-ought not to be a big problem, especially in cases where the settlement is
proposed pre-certification. Upon closer scrutiny, however, it is clear that Rule
23(e) should apply, and the courts have so held.
To begin, it must be remembered that Rule 23(e) is concerned with preventing
abuse of the class action device, as well as protecting absent class members. It
takes little imagination to envision a situation where claimants seek to exploit the
threat of an all-or-nothing class action lawsuit to exact an excessive settlement,
possibly at the expense of similarly situated absent class members who are now left
to sue a poorer defendant on their own behalf. For this reason, courts have long
held that approval of such settlements is mandatory under Rule 23(e).2® There is
always the risk that representatives suing a defendant with limited funds will be
tempted to take a larger individual settlement through an early, private settlement
rather than waiting for a smaller payout as part of a class-wide settlement. If there
is a risk of insolvency of the defendant, the representative plaintiffs resemble
creditors seeking preferential treatment from a failing debtor. Since the
representative plaintiffs assume a fiduciary relationship with the absent putative
class members, such conduct is plainly improper.2"'
In addition, the other principal aim of Rule 23(e)-protecting absent class
members-is also implicated by private settlements with putative class
representatives. As one early decision explained: "The very bringing of a class
action, especially where counsel are known to be skilled in the field, may deter the
institution of suits by members of the ostensible class. The passage of time may
impair or defeat the rights of others thus deflected from acting for themselves."2 2
Again, this concern is consistent with the fiduciary obligations of class
200. See, e.g., Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324, 328 (E.D. Pa.
1967) ("[Nbo litigant should be permitted to enhance his own bargaining power by merely alleging that
he is acting for a class of litigants."); see also Burgener v. California Adult Auth., 407 F. Supp. 555,
560 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Moreland v. Rucker Pharmacal Co., 63 F.R.D. 611, 614 (W.D. La. 1974).
201. See, e.g., Diaz v. Trust Territory ofPac. Islands, 876 F.2d 1401,1408 (gth Cir. 1989) (citing
Newman v. Stein, 464 F.2d 689 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1039, 93 S. Ct. 521 (1972)). In
Louisiana, the guiding civilian concepts can be found within the Civil Code articles governing the
revocatory action.
202. Muntz v. Ohio Screw Prods., 61 F.R.D. 396, 398 (N.D. Ohio 1973) (quoting Rothman v.
Gould, 52 F.R.D. 494,496 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)).
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representatives to assert and promote the interests of all absent putative class
members. 3
Rule 23(e), of course, requires both court approval of the settlement andnotice
to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs. Some courts have
taken this language to require that notice of individual settlements with class
representatives be given to absent class members in all cases.2' The vast majority
of the cases, however, have refused to impose a per se rule with respect to notice
of such private settlements, allowing the courts to exercise their discretion to forego
notice where it is unnecessary to ensure that the purposes of Rule 23(e) are
served.2 5 Many of these cases appear to base this conclusion upon questions as to
whether Rule 23(e) applies at all where absent class members are not to be bound
by the proposed settlement. This reasoning, as noted above, is flawed; nonetheless,
the discretion vested in the district court under Rule 23(e) with respect to notice
ought to allow a judge to forego notice in cases where it appears unnecessary to
promote the goals of the rule. It is possible to envision situations where notice
could unnecessarily impede a proposed settlement (a favored means for resolving
the parties' disputes),2os impose unjust costs upon litigants,2°7 and/or invite abuse.Os
Regardless, if the court believes that there is reason to be concerned about possible
collusion or some sort of prejudice to absent class members, then notice must be
provided. Failure to do so may require that the settlement be vacated if collaterally
attacked by an absent class member.2' 9
Once the class action has been certified, an entirely different situation arises.
Courts will not approve of a private settlement with the representatives without
203. The court may not assume that, merely because they did not intervene or otherwise take any
active interest in the class action, the absent members did not rely upon the pendency of the class
demand and on that basis delay acting on their own behalf:
A class member has no duty to intervene, opt out, or take any other action regarding a class
action until the class has been certified and notice of class membership sent. The district
court erred in concluding that a lack of action by the class indicated a lack of reliance on the
filing of the class action.
Diaz, 876 F.2d at 1410 (citing American Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 552, 94 S. Ct. 756
(1974)). Because of the deference given by the law to the act offling documents into the public record,
this result would seem inevitable.
204. See, e.g., Papilsky v. Berndt, 466 F.2d 251, 257 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1077, 93
S. Ct. 689 (1973); Pittson Co. v. Reeves, 263 F.2d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 1959); Rothman, 52 F.R.D. at
496; see also Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 46 F.R.D. 442 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Muntz, 61 F.R.D. at
398 (holding that court could approve private pre-certification settlement with class representatives
without notice "only if it determines that this particular settlement is an exception to the notice
requirement").
205. See, e.g., Simerv. Rios, 661 F.2d 655,666(7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 917,102
S. Ct. 1773 (1982); Shelton v. Pargo, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298, 1314-16 (4th Cir. 1978); Berse v. Berman,
60 F.R.D. 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); see also Diaz, 876 F.2d 1408-11; Glidden v. Chromalloy Am. Corp.,
808 F.2d 621, 627 (7th Cir. 1986); Michael A. Almond, Settling Rule 23 Class Actions At the Pre-
Certification Stage: Is Notice Required?, 56 N.C. L. Rev. 303, 317-31 (1978).
206. See, e.g., Shelton v. Pargo, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298 (4th Cir. 1978); Magana v. Platzer Shipyard,
Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61 (S.D. Tex 1977).
207. See, e.g., Austin v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections, 876 F. Supp. 1437 (E.D. Pa. 1995);
see also Baham v. Southern Tel. & Tel. Co., 55 F.R.D. 478 (W.D. La. 1972).
208. See, e.g., Simer, 661 F.2d at 665-66.
209. See Diaz, 876 F.2d at 1410-11; see also Pittson Co., 263 F.2d at 330-31.
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notice to absent class members, inviting them to intervene in order to continue the
litigation"' or without some equivalent guarantee that an adequate representative
will remain to continue the litigation."' Obviously, the desire of a class
representative to settle is clearly relevant to his or her adequacy as a class
representative. The timing of the representative's withdrawal should also be
carefully scrutinized to ensure against collusion or other prejudice to the absent
class members. 2
The foregoing analysis ought to apply regardless of whether the settlement is
presented in terms of a request for approval of settlement, or a request for a
voluntary dismissal pursuant to a settlement. Furthermore, litigants should not be
permitted to avoid Rule 23(e) merely by seeking to peel away the class action
elements of a suit before settlement, as through a Rule 15 amendment deleting the
class action demand," or even through more subtle conduct, such as foregoing
timely submission of a request for certification. Indeed, if done to avoid Rule 23(e)
in collusion with the defendant, such practice comes close to a fraud on the court.
2. Settlement with Absent Class Members
Defendants may also approach class actions by attempting to negotiate private
settlements with absent class members. If done pre-certification, the defendant may
hope that enough class members can be weeded out to frustrate certification by
making joinder a feasible alternative. Not only may the defendant thus be able to
push for favorable terms with absent class members who have not had their
expectations colored by direct conmmuications with zealous class counsel, this
alternative-because it does not affect the interests of non-settling class
members-will not trigger Rule 23(e)'s approval and notice requirements.""
Of course, the strategic advantages of this approach to defendants also opens
the window to potential abuse. Unsupervised communications between defense,
counsel and absent class members could become an occasion for misleading
representations to unrepresented layman. In addition, some members of the
plaintiffs' bar have complained that allowing defendants a free hand to weed out
class members perceived to have the least interest in the litigation could become a
means of stripping the utility of class-action procedure. This may be true
particularly in cases where a class action is being utilized to pursue claims that
individuals acting alone might not have a sufficient motive to prosecute, such as is
the case with many consumer-interest suits.
210. See. e.g., Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.R.D. 494,496 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
211. See, e.g., Milonas v. Amerada Hess Corp, 25 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (CBC) 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
212. See Kincade v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 635 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1981); see also, e.g.,
Hanzley v. Blue Cross, Inc., 1989-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,604, at 61,190 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 30,1989).
213. See, e.g., Yaffe v. Detroit Steel Corp, 50 F.R.D. 481,483 (N.D. ll. 1970).
214. See, e.g., Christensen v. Kiewit-Murdock Inv. Corp., 815 F.2d 206 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 908, 108 S. Ct. 250 (1987); In re General Motors Corp., Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d
1106, 1138 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 870, 100 S. Ct. 146 (1979); Moreland v. Rucker
Pharmacal Co., 63 F.R.D. 611 (W.D. La. 1974).
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Responding to the former concern, most courts have concluded that there are
ethical constraints upon the ability of defense counsel to engage in ex parte
communications with absent putative class members, even pre-certification. 2"'
Rules 3.4, 4.2, and 8.4 of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct impose
significant constraints upon such communications in any case arising in Louisiana.
However, a flat bar against such communications has been held by the U.S. Fifth
Circuit to violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution."6 The second concern-focused upon preserving the utility of class-
action procedure-has not been well received in the jurisprudence. '  The
reasoning behind these decisions seems sound.18
One final issue, although somewhatbeyond the scope of this article, concerns
individual settlements in mass tort litigation involving the use of mandatory punitive
damages classes. Presumably, even with respect to a "mandatory" class, private
individual settlements should be permissible. However, allowing such settlements
would seem to presuppose that the settling defendants will be able to claim some
sort of credit, or offset, against any punitive class award based on allocated
"punitive damages" included in a settlement.2"9
I. CLASS ACTION SETHLEMENTS IN THE LOUISIANA STATE COURTS
The class action rules in the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, as amended
by Acts 1997, No. 839, § 1, address the settlement of class action lawsuits at two
places, Article 594 and Article 591(B)(4). Article 594 is the principal provision
governing the compromise of class actions. Although clearly rooted in Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23(e) and the federal jurisprudence interpreting that rule, Article
594 both expands upon and modifies the federal rule and the practice under it.
Article 591(B)(4) implements a proposal advanced, but ultimately tabled, by the
Federal Rules Advisory Committee to amend Rule 23(b) specifically to provide for
settlement classes. In the wake of Amchem and Oritz, this latter provision may
prove to be one of the more significant procedural changes to Louisiana law in the
past decade. Clearly, it is an open invitation to class counsel increasingly frustrated
215. See, e.g.,Kleinerv. FirstNat'l Bank ofAtlanta, 751 F.2d 1193,1203(1l thCir. 1985); Bower
v. Bunker Hill Co., 689 F. Supp. 1032 (E.D. Wash. 1985); Resnick v. American Dental Assoc., 95
F.R.D. 372 (N.D. 1I 1982); see also Fulco v. Continental Cablevision, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 45 (D. Mass.
1992).
216. Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 619 F.2d 459,477 (5thCir. 1980) (en banc), aff'd, 452 U.S. 89,101
S. Ct. 2193 (1981); see also Cada v. Cost Line, Inc., 93 F.R.D. 95 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
217. See, e.g., Weight Watchers of Philadelphia, Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 455 F.2d 770,
773 (2d Cir. 1972).
218. See id. ("We are unable to perceive any legal theory that would endow a plaintiff who has
brought what would have been a "spurious" class action under former Rule 23 with a right to prevent
negotiation of settlements between the .. other potential members of the class who are of a mind to
do this....").
219. See In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 422,438 (E.D. Pa. 1984), aff'd in part. vacd in
part, 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852, 915, 107 S. Ct. 182, 318 (1986).
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by federal hostility to mass tort and similarly aggressive class actions to try their
luck before our state courts.' 0
A. Article 594
1. Paragraph (A): Approval and Notice Requirements
Pursuant to Article 594(A)(1), "[a]n action previously certified as a class action
shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court exercising
jurisdiction over the action."' This general language tracks Rule 23(e), and is
consistent with Louisiana law prior to the 1997 amendment of Article 59 4 .'
Article 594(A)(2) provides that "[n]otice of the proposed dismissal of an action
previously certified as a class action shall be provided to all members of the class,
together with the terms of any proposed compromise that the named parties have
entered into. Notice shall be given in such manner as the court directs.
"
' This
subsection also tracks Rule 23(e), which provides that 'notice of the proposed
dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner
as the court directs."'
Despite the obvious similarities between Subsections (1) and (2) of Article
594(A) and Rule 23(e), there are a few noteworthy distinctions. The first significant
demarcation is the explicit limitation of the approval and notice requirements to
actions "previously certified as a class action," instead of "class actions" generally,
as is the case under Rule 23(e). This refined language must be read in tandem with
Article 591 (B)(4), which unlike Rule 23 expressly provides for the certification of
settlement classes. So read, it appears that Article 594(A) mandates court scrutiny
and notice of any settlement on behalf of a certified class, while it exempts pre-
220. See Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Life After Amchem: The Class Struggle Continues, 31 Loy. LA.
L. Rev. 373, 386-94 (1998) (discussing migration of class actions from federal to state court); Class
Actions: High Court's Amchem Ruling Raises Issues on Scope of Class Settlements, Panelists Say, 66
U.S.L.W. 2122 (Aug. 26, 1997) (predicting that "Amchem will accelerate the trend of bringing class
actions in state courts"); Resnik, supra note 106, at 842-43; John C. Coffee Jr., After the High Court
Decision in Anichem Products Inc. v. Windsor, Can a Class Action Ever Be Certified Only for the
Purpose of Settlement?, Nat'l LJ., July 21, 1997, at B4 ("The migration of class actions to state courts,
which began in the wake of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, is also likely to
accelerate after Amchem."). Louisiana practitioners can attest to this trend first hand, as is exemplified
by the migration of the class action suit de-certified by the Third Circuit in In re General Motors Corp.
Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995) (rejecting proposed
nationwide settlement ofproduct liability class action concerning General Motors pickup trucks), which
re-appeared, in almost identical terms, in Louisiana shortly thereafter. See White v. General Motors
Corp., 718 So. 2d 480 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1998); see also Edward F. Sherman, Class Action Practice
in the Gulf South, 74 Tul. L. Rev. 1603, 1604 nn.l-2 (2000) (discussing the migration of class action
litigation to Louisiana, Texas, and Alabama).
221. La. Code Civ. P. art. 594(AX).
222. See, e.g., Verdin v. Thomas, 191 So. 2d 646,651-52 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
223. La. Code Civ. P. art. 594(AX2) (emphasis added). As discussed elsewhere, the discretion
afforded under the second sentence of this Article may well allow district courts to dispense with notice
altogether in certain circumstances. See supra notes 204-209 and accompanying text.
224. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
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certification, individual settlements with class representatives, presumably even
where they will result in the dismissal of the putative class action. 22
If Article 594(A) is interpreted as exempting individual settlements with class
representatives from the article's notice and approval requirements, it would
represent a marked departure from federal practice."6 As noted above, federal
courts have long construed Rule 23(e) as mandating judicial scrutiny of individual
settlements with. putative class representatives in order to prevent the manipulation
of the class devise to extort unjust settlements at the expense of absent class
members.2 Similarly, although subject to the courts' discretion," notice of pre-
certification, individual settlements with class representatives is also generally
required to ensure that absent class members are not prejudiced by the dismissal of
a class action which they are relying upon to advocate their rights and interests.229
The same concerns are triggered by attempts to amend pleadings to excise class
demands, whether directly or through an unopposed exception of misjoinder, if
undertaken to facilitate individual settlements with putative class representatives.
The potential for abuse of the class action device in the context of pre-certification
settlements with the named representatives is troubling and there is no obvious
justification for carving out such settlements from the approval and notice
requirements applicable under Article 594(A) to class-wide settlements.
While Subsections (1) and (2) of Article 594(A) somewhat narrow the scope
of the approval and notice requirements under the source federal rule and
jurisprudence, Article 594(A)(2) expands on the notice requirements under Rule
23(e) by expressly mandating both notice of the settlement and of the terms of the
compromise, while preserving the court's discretion otherwise to regulate the
method and contents of the notice. Nevertheless, federal practice in this area should
continue to provide guidance to the Louisiana courts, ' "e both with respect to what
should be included in settlement notices and with respect to how that notice should
be given." As he federal jurisprudence illustrates, the minimum information now
expressly required to be present in notices under Article 594(A)(2) ought to be
included in any event. Ordinarily, notice should be supplemented with such details
as the time and place of the fairness hearing, directions on how to obtain additional
225. Similarly, ina case such as Speaks v. New York Life Ins. Co., 693 So. 2d 340 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1997), wherein the court struggled with the adequacy of "informal" notice to putative class
members of the dismissal of a class action demand by amendment of the named plaintiffs' petition, the
result is now much easier: in the absence of prior certification, dismissal requires neither notice nor
court approval (absent requirements imposed under other provisions, such as La. Code Civ. P. art.
1151).
226. See supra Part I(GXI).
227. See. e.g., Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324,328 (E.D. Pa.
1967) ("No litigant should be permitted to enhance his own bargaining power by merely alleging that
he is acting for a class ... !).
228. See, e.g., Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61,67-68 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
229. See supra notes 204-209 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Diaz v. Trust Territory of
Pac. Islands, 876 F.2d 1401, 1410 (9th Cir. 1989).
230. See Billieson v. City of New Orleans, 729 So. 2d 146, 152 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1999).
231. See supra Part (D).
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information, procedures for objecting, and an explanation of the reasons for the
settlement, including the risks and potential benefits to class members that would
attend the continuation of the action. 2 While the parties are not obligated to
exhaust all possible means of identifying and giving notice to class members,
233
reasonable efforts must be fully pursued on both counts.'
2. Preliminary Approval
Article 594, like Rule 23(e), does not expressly contemplate preliminary
approval of the proposed settlement as a prerequisite to the issuance of notice.
Nonetheless, obtaining preliminary approval for a proposed class action settlement
is common practice in the state courts already, and that practice should be
continued. Even if a trial court were willing to agree to dispense with this
preliminary inquiry, the parties themselves would be well advised to pursue input
from the court as early in the process as possible." s A preliminary hearing or
conference is not only useful to avoid waste and to help educate the court, but it is
also an excellent opportunity for the parties and the court to resolve logistical
details concerning notice, objections, and the like. The Complex Litigation Bench
Book for Judges, published by the Committee on Complex Litigation through the
Louisiana Supreme Court, specifically contemplates a preliminary hearing for
exactly these reasons." Moreover, as noted above, approval is often granted with
no formal hearing even at the federal preliminary level.237 The Complex Litigation
Bench BookforJudges describes the appropriate inquiry at this stage as follows:
Proposed settlements are presented to the trial judge for review and
preliminary approval. If a case is being settled without substantial
232. See also State of Louisiana, Complex Litigation Bench Book for Judges 3-22 (1997) C'lf the
trial judge preliminarily approves the proposed settlement, be/she then goes to the second step and
orders that all class members be given notice of the proposed settlement and their right to appear at the
hearing thereon to make their objections.") (hereinafter Louisiana Bench Book for Judges]. Cf. La.
Code Civ. P. art. 594(B) (requiring that members of the class be permitted an opportunity to be heard
at fairness hearing, thereby at least implicitly requiring that adequate notice of the hearing and minimal
information about the process for objecting and being heard be included in the noticeto class members);
Louisiana Bench Book for Judges 3-22 (stating that properly noticed fairness hearing is required by due
process).
233. See, e.g., Bums v. Elrod, 757 F.2d 151, 154 (7th Cir. 1985).
234. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
235. The expense and burden of providing notice and proceeding with the full fairness hearing
would be futile in cases in which the terms of settlement are facially unsatisfactory.
236. See Louisiana Bench Book for Judges, supra note 232, at 3-22.
237. Ordinarily, the parties should at a minimum supply the court with joint statement setting forth
the terms of the settlement and briefs, incuiding supporting documentation and affidavits, sufficient to
make a prima facie case for the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the settlement. Id. at 5.
238. The Complex Litigation Bench Book for Judges is the fruition of an extended project by the
Louisiana Supreme Court and the Judicial Counsel. Overall, it provides an extremely useful and
practical overview of complex litigation practice in the state. The Bench Book was published prior to
the 1997 amendments to Articles 591-597 and, hence, is somewhat dated at places; nonetheless, it
remains useful and instructive on most issues.
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litigation, the judge should satisfy him/herself that there has been no
collusion in confecting the settlement. In considering whether the
settlement should be approved, the court should be satisfied that it
represents the results of an "arm's length" bargain that appears fair and
reasonable and within the range of probable judicial approval.""
After examining the same core factors that it must consider at the formal
fairness hearing, the court should preliminarily approve or disapprove the
settlement. Again, it is perfectly appropriate for the court at this stage to notify the
parties ofparticular provisions in the proposed settlement that it finds troubling, and
even to explain to them what changes the court feels would be necessary to gain
final approval of a proposed agreement that the court is nonetheless prepared
preliminarily to approve.'e Of course, preliminary approval is not a mandatory
prerequisite to obtaining a definitive ruling from the court at a fairness hearing, and
the parties are thus free to force the issue should they deem that to be appropriate.
3. Paragraph (B): The Fairness Hearing
Article 594(B) provides that:
After notice of the proposed compromise has been provided to the
members of the class, the court shall order a hearing to determine whether
the proposed compromise is fair, reasonable, and adequate for the class.
At such hearing, all parties to the action, including members of the class,
shall be permitted an opportunity to be heard.
24
Under this article, a formal fairness hearing is expressly mandated. As noted
above, the practice of the federal courts is to conduct a formal hearing in almost
every case where the dismissal or compromise of a class action is before the court.
However, Rule 23(e) does not mandate this'procedure, and a formal hearing is not
always afforded to the parties."4 Although an amendment to Rule 23(e) that would
have mandated a hearing in all cases was proposed, 3 it was subsequently tabled by
the Advisory Committee. Nevertheless, the proposal was evidently picked up by
the redactors of Article 594.
As is true under Rule 23(e), the fairness hearing is not a "mini trial" on the
merits of the class' claims; rather, the court is to concern itself merely with
determining whether or not the terms of the proposed settlement are within a
plausible range of results that the parties-faced with the uncertainties of
litigation-could reasonably have agreed to in the exercise of their business
239. Louisiana Bench Book for Judges, supra note 232, at 3-22.
240. See. e.g., In re California Micro Devices Sec. Litig.,No. C-94-2817-VRW, 1995 WL476625
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 1995); Morales v. Turman, 569 F. Supp. 332 (E.D. Tex. 1983).
241. La. Code Civ. P. art. 594(B).
242. See. e.g., Malchman v. Davis, 706 F.2d 426,434 (2d Cir. 1983); Weinberger v. Kendrick,
698 F.2d 61,79 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,464 U.S. 818,104 S. Ct. 77 (1983). Cf Saunders v. Naval
Air Rework Facility, 608 F.2d 1308, 1311-12 (9th Cir. 1979).
243. See Advisory Comm. Minutes, 167 F.R.D. at 565.
[Vol. 61
KENT A. LAMBERT
judgment. The same factors and inquiries developed in the federal courts for
evaluating proposed settlements under Rule 23(e) can and should influence
Louisiana's state courts conducting fairness hearings under Article 594(B).2"
As is true under the federal case law, Article 594(B) entitles members of the
class to appear and be heard at the fairness hearing. Nonetheless, as is also true
under federal jurisprudence, it is entirely appropriate for courts to make this right
contingent upon the timely submission of written objections and reasonable
procedural steps."' Finally, the trial court should issue specific findings and
conclusions in its decision in order to facilitate appellate review.'
A decision approving a proposed class action settlement should be appealable
as a final judgment."' 7 However, an order denying approval of a class action
settlement probably should not be immediately appealable; instead, review should
be sought through the discretionary exercise ofappellate supervisoryjurisdiction. 2""
Despite the law's predisposition in favor of settlements, the decision by the trial
court to approve or disapprove of a proposed class action settlement is entirely
discretionary and, hence, should be reviewable only for the abuse of that
discretion.'"
4. Miscellaneous Provisions ofArticle 594
Article 594 reflects some other procedural refinements worthy of note. First,
pursuant to Article 594(C), "[t]he court shall retain the authority to review and
approve any amount paid'as attorney fees pursuant to the compromise of a class
action, notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary." Article 594(D) adds that
"[a]ny agreement entered by the parties to a class action that provides for the
payment of attorneys' fees is subject to judicial approval." Read together, these two
244. See supra Part I(E); see also, e.g., City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d
Cir. 1974); Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir.), reh"g denied, 671 F.2d 1378 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 828, 103 S. Ct. 63 (1982); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195
(5th Cir.), aftd, 659 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 998, 102 S. Ct. 2283, 2308
(1982).
245. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text; see also Walsh v. Great At]. & Pac. Tea Co.,
726 F.2d 956 (3d Cir. 1983).
246. See, e.g., Piambino v. Bailey, 757 F.2d 1112,1139(11th Cir. 1985), cer. denied sub nom.
Hoffman v. Sylva, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S. Ct. 2889 (1986).
247. In order for absent class members who received actual notice of the fairness hearing to
preserve standing to attack it on appeal, they should register their objections in accordance with the
procedure set forth in the notice. See supra notes 49-50 and 173-174. And, as is true in the federal
courts, "futility" should be no excuse for a class member's failure to object should the non-objector later
seek standing on appeal. An opt-out from the settlement class, however, should not be required and,
indeed, may well bar standing to challenge settlement approval on appeal. Id.
248. See supra Part (F); see also, e.g., Seigal v. Merrick, 590 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1978).
However, given the likelihood of injustice from delay, in addition to the absence of any chance for
meaningful review on appeal, it would be unusual indeed for the appellate courts to decline to review
such rulings on a supervisory basis.
249. See supra note 60; see also In re Corrupted Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195,218
(5th Cir.), a/Id by 659 F.2d 1337 (5th Cir. 1981).
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paragraphs provide welcome amplification and clarification to the federal
jurisprudence on the subject of judicial scrutiny of attorney fees in class action
settlements.' ° Under these provisions scrutiny should extend to the applications
submitted under "ceiling" and "clear sailing" agreements, as well as to settlement
agreements purporting to obligate the defendant to pay class counsel's fees
independent of(i.e., in addition to) those amounts to be paid into a common fund
for the benefit of class members."' Similarly, just because a defendant purports to
reserve the right to challenge class counsel's fee application (or the right to appeal
an award rendered on an unopposed application), careful scrutiny of class counsel's
fee application is still appropriate."'
Article 594(E) reiterates the provisions previously contained under former
Article 594(B), reconciling the approval and administration of common-fund
settlements with the Code of Civil Procedure's provisions governing the procedural
capacity of minors, interdicts, successions, and other incompetents or absentees.
B. Settlement Classes under the 1997 Amendments to Code of Civil Procedure
Article 591
Probably the most interesting change to the rules governing the settlement of
class actions effected by the 1997 revision to the Code of Civil Procedure's class
action articles does not even appear in Article 594. For this we turn to newly-
introduced Article 591(B)(4) which provides for the certification of Subparagraph
(B)(3) classes "for purposes of settlement" in any case where the threshold
requirements of Article 591 (A) are met-regardless of whether the requirements for
certification imposed under Subparagraph (B)(3) are also satisfied. This provision
was obviously lifted from a proposed amendment to Rule 23, advanced by the
Federal Rules Advisory Committee in 1996 in an attempt to clarify federal law in
this highly controversial area of class action practice."' The proposed amendment
250. See supra Part I(EXIXa).
251. See supra notes 82 and 85 and accompanying text.
252. Id. Mention should be made at this point of a related and evolving trouble spot with class
action fee awards-fee sharing agreements between class counsel. By way ofexample, the U.S. Second
Circuit expressly disapproved of a fee-sharing arrangement between class counsel. In this agreement
certain "deep-pocket" members of the plaintiffs' management committee agreed to front a large portion
of the class' litigation expenses in exchange for a three-fold return on investment out of any approved
fee award to be afforded priority over the fee claims of other class attorneys, who would then participate
in a pro rata distribution of the remainder of the funds allocated for attorneys' fees. In re "Agent
Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216,224 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Schwartz v. Dean, 484
U.S. 926,108 S. Ct. 289 (1987). Inter alia, the Second Circuit was troubled by this agreement because
it provided for fees entirely unrelated to the services provided by the "investing" attorneys, and, more
importantly, because it presented an obvious conflict of interest between the influential constituency
of class attorneys and the class they represented. Id. at 223-24. Cf Brown v. Seimers, 726 So. 2d 1018
(La. App. 5th Cir. 1999). As noted above, other collusive practices between class counsel have recently
sparked arguments urging the extension of antitrust liability to certain anti-competitive arrangements
occasionally "negotiated" amongst purportedly competing plaintiffs' counsel.
253. See Civil Rules Advisory Conmittee, Draft Minutes, 167 F.R.D. 539,563 (1996) (explaining
that the amendment was designed to resolve the "newly apparent disagreement" between courts that
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to the Federal Rules, which provided for an identical result with respect to
"settlement classes" under Rule 23(b)(3), was tabled in the wake of the Supreme
Court's decision inAmchem.? In consequence, the federal approach to settlement
classes, as it has evolved under both Amchem and Ortiz, is somewhat distinct from
the approach established by the Louisiana legislature for state courts-a variance
that has the potential to become even more pronounced in the inmediate future.
Interestingly, the only reported Louisiana decision to address the use of
settlement classes under Louisiana law as it existed prior to the enactment of Article
591(B)(4) explicitly followed Amchem. In that case, the Louisiana First Circuit
Court of Appeal concluded that the requirements for certification under Article
591(B) had to be met in addition to those under Article 591(A) before a settlement
class could be approved as part of a proposed class action settlement."' Clearly,
this is no longer the law in Louisiana, although exactly how much of an influence
Amchem and its progeny will have in at least curtailing the potentially expansive
language of Article 591(B)(4) remains to be seen. Because the article speaks in
permissive terms only, it does not purport to strip trial courts of the discretion to
refuse certification to settlement classes even where the requirements of Article
591(A) are met. Therefore, it is recommended that courts use the requirements for
certification under Article 591(B)(3) to inform their scrutiny of any settlement class
proposed under Article 591(B)(4) in much the same way federal courts are
instructed to proceed under Amchem.
HI. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
Common wisdom says that power corrupts, and the class action is an
extraordinarily powerful tool. This procedure simultaneously vests class counsel
with sizeable leverage over the defendant and unprecedented authority to speak for
and bind masses of individuals without the immediate and direct accountability that
defines the traditional lawyer-client relationship. It should be of no surprise, then,
that class action settlements, like other areas of class action practice, have been an
occasion for abuse in the past. In turn, the proverbial pendulum, driven by
increasing criticism by the mass media and others, has begun to swing toward the
curtailment of the discretion of the parties and their counsel to fashion and
implement potentially sweeping class action settlements. The halcyon days in
permit settlement class actions even if the class could not be certified for trial, and the recent Third
Circuit decisions, citing Georgine v. Amchern Products, Inc., 83 F.3d 610,626 (3d Cir. 1996), aff'd on
other grounds sub nom. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997); and
In re General. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 799 (3d Cir.
1995)).
254. See supra notes 108-114 and accompanying text.
255. • White v. General Motors Corp., 718 So. 2d 480,489-91 (La. App. 1 st Cir.), writ denied; 729
So. 2d 591 (La. 1998). Interestingly, although the first circuit overturned the lower court's decision
approving the settlement and remanded the case for further proceedings and findings in line with
Amchem, it later approved the settlement in January 1999 when presented with these findings. Recall
that this lawsuit was filed in Louisiana in the wake of the failed attempt to obtain approval of a similar
settlement before the U.S. Third Circuit
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which we might have justifiably anticipated extreme judicial deference to nearly any
settlement jointly proposed by a defendant and class counsel may be waning, but
this should not come as altogether unwelcome news.
Certainly, there are enough real-world examples of abuse in connection with
class action settlements to counsel a good deal more caution than is evident in many
early cases, wherein the courts were quick to presume the fairness of settlements
based upon little more than a prima facie showing that the proposed compromise
was the product of "real" negotiations between defendants and class counsel."s
Examples range from the now-infamous Bank of Boston debacle 5 7 (which has
prompted stinging criticism not only from academia2 8 but from the bar as well) 9
to less overt examples of abuse, including the exploitation of"futures claimants,"" 6
cy pres distributions,26' and non-pecuniary consideration 262 to inflate class
counsel's fees;. 3 inventory settlements; 2" and reverse-auctioning." '26 Nonetheless,
this plethora of potential abuses does not necessarily warrant legislative reform.
Indeed, changes in the procedural framework for the review and approval of class
action settlements is probably premature at present, as the bench has only recently
begun fully to embrace and exploit the mechanical safeguards already built into the
approval process under Rule 23 and, now, Article 594. Indeed, without allowing
courts a fair opportunity to apply these rules with the benefit of the growing
consciousness of the abuses that can accompany class-wide settlements, new
legislation might well do more harm than good, especially at the state level, where
256. See, e.g., M. Berenson Co. v. Faneuil Hall Marketplace., Inc., 671 F. Supp. 819, 822 (D.
Mass 1987); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 607 F. Supp. 1312, 1320 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
257. See Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1996), reh 'g denied, 100
F.3d 1348 (with five dissents), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1204, 117 S. Ct. 1569 (1997).
258. See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 Va. L. Rev.
1051, 1057-68 (996).
259. See, e.g., Hon. Milton I. Shadur, From the Bench: The Unclassy Class Action, 23 Litig. No.
2, at 3 (Winter 1997).
260. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 70, at 1394 (discussing Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157
F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994), vacated, 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), affd sub nom Amchen Prods. Inc.
v. Windor, 521 U.S. 491,117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997)); see also Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d
287 (N.J. 1987).
261. Coffee, supra note 70, at 1367-75.
262. See generally, e.g., In Camera, 16 Class Action Rep. 369, 485-87 nn.2-8 (1993) (surveying
coupon settlements shown to be worthless to class members); Brian Wolfman & Alan B. Morrison,
Representing the Unrepresented In Class Actions Seeking Monetary Relief, 71 N.Y.U. L Rev. 439,
472-74 (1996).
263. See, e.g., In reGeneral Motors Pick-Up Truck Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768,780-81,807-09
(3d Cir. 1995).
264. See, e.g., Georgine, 83 F.3d at 630; Koniak, supra note 258, at 1063; Coffee, supra note 70,
at 1373-74.
265. See, e.g., Prezant v. DeAngelis, 636 A.2d 915, 917-18 (Del. 1994), see also Coffee, supra
note 70, at 1370-73. For an interesting variation on this type of practice-and an example of the
scathing media treatment often afforded to perceived settlement abuses--see Richard B. Schmitt, Class
Action? Louisiana-Pacific Cut a Quick Deal to Avert Homeowner Lawsuits: Now Claims on Faulty
Siding Exceed Settlement Fund, But Lawyers Are Happy, Wall Street Journal, July 24, 1998 at Al.
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multi-jurisdictional class actions are flourishing in the wake of Amchem and
Oraz.
26 6
That said, there are several pressing issues that cry out for special attention by
members of the bench and bar alike. Solely in the hope of generating further
discourse, I offer below a brief list of a few of the more significant emerging
problem areas affecting class action settlement practice not just locally, but
nationally. In no particular order, and without any pretense at a comprehensive
survey of the recent jurisprudence and commentary in this area, my brief list of
settlement related concerns is as follows:
1. Settlements ofMulti-Jurisdictional Class Actions in State Court. The
pendency of multiple class actions involving at least one state-court
proceeding can be particularly nettlesome because the federal multi-
district litigation rules do not apply. Making matters worse, because
of Louisiana's unique legal heritage, the consolidation of a Louisiana
class action with overlapping suits is often viewed with special
skepticism. Accordingly, Louisiana's state court jurists need to be
prepared to deal with such potential abuses as fee auctioning and the
exploration of gratuitous, "copy-cat" class action suits filed by
opportunistic lawyers with the goal of borrowing off other lawyers'
efforts to extort easy fees out of the defendant-ultimately at the
expense of the class. While this obviously is a case-specific concern,
as a general matter, courts should be cognizant of potential warning
signs, such as settlements that purport to expand upon the class
definition, allegations, or demands alleged in the plaintiffs' petition,
and any settlements with overly broad releases.267
2. "Cy Pres "Distributions of Settlement Awards. The use of cypres or
fluid fund provisions in common-fund class actions is increasingly
common, and can be used to good effect. Nonetheless, it is a device
that can be manipulated in collusive settlements to the detriment of
absent class members (as where it is used to inflate fees while
266. See supra note 1.
267. This latter indicator actually raises a related concern: whether it is possible and appropriate
to obtain a class-wide release that is broader than the claims set forth on behalf of the class in the
plaintiffs' pleadings. Based on the reasoning in Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367,
116 S. Ct. 873 (1996), it appears that such releases are enforceable if there was adequate representation
and appropriate notice and opportunity for opting out to absent class members. Even so, aggressive
releases, such as releases purporting to reach future claimants or even just uncertified individual claims,
may nonetheless be improper, not to mention inappropriate from an ethical and professional/fiduciary
dutyviewpoint. See Amchern v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 491,625-37, 117 S. Ct. 2231,2250-51 (1997); see
also La. R.S. 37:4-16, La. R. Prof. Cond. 1.8(g) (1987) ("A lawyer who represents two or more clients
shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the clients ... unless
each client consents after consultation, including disclosure of the existence and nature of all the claims
or pleas involved and of the participation of each person in the settlement.") Cf Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Ethics and the Settlements of Mass Torts: When the Rules Meet the Roads, 80 Comell L.
Rev. 1159,1188 (1995).
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affording the defendant a structured, cheaper payment).26S Certainly,
such distributions are inappropriate whenever there is a viable means
to make (or even attempt) distributions to the injured class members
themselves. Moreover, such distributions should also be constrained
to situations where the designated beneficiary is such that absent class
members receive some sort of ascertainable indirect benefit.
269
3. Notice of Settlement. Although Article 594 provides a little more
guidance than Rule 23(e) as to inclusions in the typical settlement
notice, both leave a great deal to the courts to figure out for
themselves. While this provides important flexibility, it seems
worthwhile for Louisiana courts to take advantage of the introduction
of new legislation to refine the guideposts governing settlement
notices. Examples of the sort of information that ordinarily is and/or
ought to be found within such notices is set forth above.27 It is
generally in the interest of all involved-the named plaintiffs, absent
class members, defendants, court, and counsel-to ensure that this
notice is as accessible and comprehensive as possible to minimize the
potential for needless objections and substantively unwarranted
collateral attacks.
4. Settlement Classes. This issue is addressed extensively above. While
Amchem and Oritz afford excellent benchmarks for federal courts and
practitioners, the enactment of Article 591(B)(4) has left state jurists
and litigators with many unknowns. As written, this new legislation
offers no guidance to state courts faced with certification requests for
settlement classes. Indeed, the rule could potentially be construed to
require no more than the satisfaction of Rule 59 1(A) and the parties'
consent. A loose and deferential approach to settlement classes is
highly problematic, however. Not only does it raise serious due
process and "case or controversy" concerns, it also invites collusion.
The legislature's decision to recognize by statute what remains a
highly controversial practice in the jurisprudence is extremely
troubling. Hopefully, the courts will exercise appropriate restraint
and ensure that the jurisprudence evolves in such a manner as to
provide necessary constraints upon the use of settlement classes.
5. Mass Torts. The question of mass tort class actions has been, and
continues to be, one of the most hotly debated issues among the class
268. This and related concerns affecting most non-monetary settlement arrangements are explored
in more detail supra at Part I(EXI)(b).
269. See In re Matzo Food Prods. Litig., 156 F.R.D. 600, 606 (D.N.J. 1994). Cf. Friedman v.
Landsdale Parking Auth., [1995 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 98,676 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31,
1995).
270. See supra Part I(D).
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action practitioners, jurists, and academicians. At the risk of diluting
what is already an exhaustive body of commentary discussing this
complex and evolving area of practice, it seems worthwhile at least
t6highlight some of the more troubling discrete concerns raised by
such suits. One of the most prominent problem areas is how to deal
with futures claimants and truly troubling questions about adequacy
of representation and standing for exposure-only mass tort victims
and other "futures." Another high-profile concern is the
unprecedented extortive leverage that such suits can have over
defendants, especially in an industry targeted by the new breed of
plaintiff mega-firms armed with novel tort theories. A single over-
zealous, under-researched expos6 by an "aggressive" television
tabloid show looking to garner ratings with a high-impact story in the
tried and true consumer interest genre can quickly snowball into a
business (and even industry) crippling onslaught of mass tort class
action litigation (witness the breast implant mel6e, which continues
to labor on despite the absence of any credible scientific support).27'
For present purposes, however, the important point is that mass tort
litigation is still an inmature, and hence volatile practice. When
mixed with the equally unstable mechanism of settlement classes, the
procedural cocktail can quickly reduce the entire proceeding to a
proverbial parade of horribles. If an outright proscription against
settlement classes in mass tort suits is going too far (or, more likely,
is a matter that must await a legislative, rather than a judicial,
resolution), then at the very least extraordinary caution should be the
rule of the day for any court, state or federal, faced with a request to
approve such an arranged settlement.
IV. CONCLUSION
Settlements in class actions are simultaneously favored and feared. They are
an expeditious and efficient resolution to what otherwise could be debilitating
litigation with the potential to overwhelm everyone involved. It is also an open
invitation for collusion and other abuses, often at the expense of the very people the
class action device is supposed to benefit.
Courts at both the state and federal levels have in place, and immediately
available to them, powerful tools to police abusive settlement practices. Guided by
an informed bar, the courts can and should make use of these tools simultaneously
to promote advantageous, amicable resolutions to certifiable class claims and to
ferret out collusive conduct from both sides of the bar.
271. See. e.g., Steven A. Holmes, It's Awful! It's Terrible! It's... Never Mind, The N.Y. Times,
July 6, 1997 at sec. 4, 3; see also Hermiann, supra note 5, at 50-51.
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